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IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
DETERMINATIONS 
By Frank Griffin, M.D., J.D.* 
 Social Security Administration (SSA) disability determinations rely on dis-
criminatory and prejudicial factors to deny people with real disabilities crucial 
benefits. “Zombie factors” (coined here) are judicial requirements for activity re-
strictions in defining disability that could virtually only be met by fictitious zom-
bies—such as living without food, personal hygiene, exercise, social interaction, 
and other necessities for human life. Administrative law judges (ALJs) often fail to 
recognize critical differences between activities of daily living (necessary for sur-
vival) and work activities—penalizing people with disabilities for activities like 
eating, bathing, and living alone, and supporting a prejudicial stereotype that 
people with work disabilities must be dependent. ALJs also often fail to recognize 
the differences between simple mainstream activities—like reading, watching tel-
evision, and going for a walk—and job activities, perpetuating a stigma that peo-
ple with disabilities cannot participate in mainstream society. The Honorable 
Judge Posner described these failures as “a recurrent, and deplorable, feature” 
of ALJ opinions. Implicit disability bias on the part of adjudicators likely plays a 
role. This paper exposes the SSA’s use of zombie factors and offers some simple 
solutions to make SSA disability determinations less arbitrary and discriminatory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) disability determination pro-
cess perpetuates the discriminatory and false stigma that people with work dis-
abilities cannot live independently, take care of themselves, or participate in 
mainstream society. The result is arbitrary interpretations of the law for claim-
ants. Specifically, SSA’s adjudicators confuse activities of daily living neces-
sary for human survival and simple mainstream activities with activities re-
quired to work a full- or part-time job. According to the Honorable Judge 
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, this failure is “a recurrent, and deplora-
ble, feature of opinions by administrative law judges in social security disabil-
ity cases” that has been going on for decades.1 In essence, many SSA adminis-
 
1  Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing “the failure to recog-
nize” that the “critical differences between activities of daily living and activities in a full-
time job are that a person has more flexibility in scheduling the former than the latter, can 
get help from other persons . . . and is not held to a minimum standard of performance, as 
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trative law judges (ALJs) require people with disabilities to be dependent, seg-
regated, and isolated from society in order to qualify for benefits—perpetuating 
and reinforcing an unfavorable stereotypical view of people with disabilities. 
The disability rights movement led to sweeping changes to the accessibility 
of American society, culture, and recreation, as well as the recognition of disa-
bility discrimination.2 “[T]he exclusion and segregation of people with disabili-
ties was viewed as discrimination” for the first time from a legal perspective 
with the passage of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, “which 
banned discrimination on the basis of disability by recipients of federal funds.”3 
Congress found that isolation and segregation of individuals with disabilities is 
a “form[] of discrimination” that continues “to be a serious and pervasive social 
problem” that prevents people with disabilities from “fully participat[ing] in all 
aspects of society.”4 Subsequent laws like the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 (ADA) and Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA) have expanded coverage of disability discrimination broadly.5 
“[A]ccess to shops, stores, restaurants, theaters, hotels and other public 
places defines community integration, inclusion and full participation” and 
helps improve both self-esteem and public perception of people with disabili-
ties.6 In 1990, the ADA helped lead to improvement in “access to transporta-
tion[] [and] access to independent and community living.”7 Today, for example, 
street corners often have “curb cuts” that make it “possible for people who use 
wheelchairs to cross the street and use sidewalks.”8 In addition, automatic lifts 
on more public buses and trains, elevators in subway systems, and automatic 
doors in public buildings are examples of many other ADA-compliant accessi-
bility changes in place today.9 
 
[the claimant] would be by an employer” and citing cases dating from 1996 to the current 
case). 
2  Judy Woodruff, 20 Years After the ADA, Is Life Better for Those with Disabilities?, PBS 
NEWS HOUR (July 26, 2010, 3:55 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/on-anniversar 
y-of-ada-is-life-better-for-those-with-disabilities [https://perma.cc/7D3X-NSK2]. 
3  Arlene Mayerson, The History of the Americans with Disabilities Act, DISABILITY RTS. 
EDUC. & DEF. FUND (1992), https://dredf.org/about-us/publications/the-history-of-the-ada/ 
[https://perma.cc/MUE4-BMH3]. 
4  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)–(2). 
5  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6)–(8), (b)(1)–(4). 
6  LEX FRIEDEN, THE IMPACT OF THE ADA IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 6 (2015), 
http://southwestada.org/html/publications/general/20150715%20ADA%20Impact%20Narrat
ive%20(Rev-Final%20v2).pdf [https://perma.cc/6TTA-AQBV] (observing that over two-
thirds of disabled individuals polled in one study “believe the ADA has been the most signif-
icant social, cultural or legislative influence on their lives in the past 25 years” with the 
greatest impact being “access to public accommodations, retail and commercial establish-
ments”; also explaining that people with disabilities believe ADA improvements “improve 
both the self-esteem of individuals with disabilities, and how they are perceived by others”). 
7  Id. 
8  Woodruff, supra note 2. 
9  Id. 
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“Implicit biases about persons with disabilities are pervasive” in American 
society.10 Almost 84 percent of able-bodied participants in one study had 
“negative [implicit] attitudes towards images of people with a disability.”11 Im-
plicit bias is defined as “the process of associating stereotypes or attitudes to-
ward categories of people without our conscious awareness.”12 The concept of 
“implicit bias” has been supported by “a large body of evidence” amassed in 
social science research regarding the “operation of unconscious motivational 
and cognitive bias.”13 Implicit biases operate subconsciously “behind the 
scenes” and may “account[] for organizationally enabled forms of discrimina-
tion.”14 So, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court described “well-
catalogued instances of invidious discrimination against the handicapped” often 
caused by “thoughtlessness and indifference.”15 The Supreme Court recognized 
a “glaring neglect” of people with disabilities as a “shameful oversight[]” of the 
U.S. that leads to people with disabilities being “shunted aside, hidden, and ig-
nored” by our society.16 
“Implicit attitudes . . . have been found to better predict actual discrimina-
tion behaviour [sic] [than explicit attitudes] because these [implicit] attitudes 
are not susceptible to social desirability,” because implicit attitudes are uncon-
scious and not readily apparent.17 Researchers continue to show substantial ef-
fects of discriminatory biases on real-world decisions in many different con-
texts.18 Most people can anecdotally think of an example of a person or two 
who is working (or appears to be working during their encounter) with an obvi-
 
10  ABA Comm’n on Disability Rts., Implicit Biases & People with Disabilities, AM. BAR 
ASS’N (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/diversity/disabilityrights/resource 
s/implicit_bias/ [https://perma.cc/RGJ2-5PNA]; see also Michelle C. Wilson & Katrina Sci-
or, Attitudes Towards Individuals with Disabilities as Measured by the Implicit Association 
Test: A Literature Review, 35 RSCH. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 294, 294, 314 (2014) 
(This review of 18 IAT studies “measuring implicit attitudes towards individuals with [disa-
bilities]” revealed that “[a]cross all studies, moderate to strong negative implicit attitudes 
were found and there was little to no association between explicit and implicit attitudes.”). 
11  Cassandra D. Dionne et al., Examining Implicit Attitudes Towards Exercisers with a Phys-
ical Disability, SCI. WORLD J., April 2013, at 1, 6, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/article 
s/PMC3654286/pdf/TSWJ2013-621596.pdf [https://perma.cc/P64R-LWL7]. 
12  ABA Comm’n on Disability Rts., supra note 10; Dionne et al., supra note 11, at 2 (ex-
plaining “[e]xplicit attitudes are conscious, controlled, and reflective, whereas implicit atti-
tudes are defined as attitudes that exist without any conscious awareness of the respondent”). 
13  Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward A Structural Account 
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 97–98 (2003). 
14  Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Em-
ployer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 854 (2007). 
15  Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295, 295 n.12 (1985). 
16  Id. at 295–96 (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 45,974 (1971)).   
17  Dionne et al., supra note 11, at 2. 
18  Green, supra note 14, at 855 (“In a variety of contexts, researchers continue to document 
the substantial effect of discriminatory biases, whether conscious or unconscious, on real-
world decisions.”). 
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ous disability, which may kindle a bias that everyone can perform some type of 
work—unless they are totally dependent and unable to leave their home. But, as 
Judge Posner also has pointed out, “[a] person can be totally disabled for pur-
poses of entitlement to social security benefits even if, because of an indulgent 
employer or circumstances of desperation, he is in fact working.”19 This paper 
will demonstrate that many SSA ALJs show an implicit bias (and sometimes an 
explicit bias) that people with work disabilities must be dependent, segregated, 
and isolated—otherwise those ALJs view the person as capable of work and not 
entitled to benefits.20 
The SSA has been described as “the Mount Everest of bureaucratic struc-
tures,”21 and the Social Security disability hearing system is “the largest adjudi-
cative agency in the western world”22 with over 1 million people awaiting an 
ALJ disability hearing request for an average of 600 days.23 Over 10,000 
people die each year while waiting for the outcome of social security disability 
determinations.24 According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), 61 million American adults in 2016 were living with a disability.25 The 
SSA receives 2.5 to 2.7 million applications for disability benefits per year, 65 
percent of which are denied.26 The SSA administers monthly disability benefits 
to approximately 10.1 million Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) re-
 
19  Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005). 
20  See discussion infra Part II. 
21  Paul R. Verkuil, The Self-Legitimating Bureaucracy, 93 YALE L.J. 780, 781 (1984) (re-
viewing JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983)) (describing the SSA as “the 
Mount Everest of bureaucratic structures: One studies it because it is there”). 
22  Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 n.2 (1983) (quoting JERRY MASHAW ET AL., 
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS xi (1978)). 
23  Social Security Testimony Before Congress: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Bea Disman, Acting 
Chief of Staff, Social Security Administration) [hereinafter SSA’s Disman Statement], https:/ 
/www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_090607.html [https://perma.cc/RC68-J2JK]. 
24  Mark Johnson, Turned Down for Federal Disability Payments, Thousands Die Waiting 
for Appeals to Be Heard, USA TODAY (Dec. 27, 2018, 11:43 AM), https://www.usatoday.co 
m/story/news/nation/2018/12/27/thousands-die-waiting-social-security-disability-insurance-
appeals/2420836002/ [https://perma.cc/32YN-LPZD] (pointing out that 10,0002 Americans 
died on the disability insurance waiting list in 2017). 
25  Disability Impacts All of Us, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cd 
c.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/infographic-disability-impacts-all.html [https://perma.cc/N 
8AL-UN7S]; Catherine A. Okoro et. al., Prevalence of Disabilities and Health Care Access 
by Disability Status and Type Among Adults–United States, 2016, 67 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 882, 887 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/mm67 
32a3.htm?s [https://perma.cc/68WE-8LDR]. 
26  Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Chart Book: Social Security Disability Insurance, 
CBPP (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/chart-book-social-
security-disability-insurance#Section_three [https://perma.cc/NUD2-6JZY]; SSA’s Disman 
Statement, supra note 23 (stating that SSA expected 2.5 million applications in 2017, which 
declined from 2.7 million in 2015). 
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cipients (averaging $1,197 per month) and 8 million Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI) recipients (averaging $551 per month).27 
The SSA disability adjudication process generally follows the “bureaucrat-
ic rationality model of administrative justice” in pursuit of “efficiency, con-
sistency, and . . . accuracy through hierarchal and rigid adherence to centrally 
formulated policies over fairness.”28 SSDI and SSI began during a time when 
“most individuals with disabilities remained in their homes, in institutions, or 
otherwise outside the mainstream of society.”29 Since then, new laws, like the 
ADA, have made independent living and mainstream activities more accessible 
than ever,30 but have not necessarily led to more employment opportunities. 
People with disabilities still face “large obstacles when it comes to finding a 
job.”31 According to “Lex Frieden, a professor at the University of Texas 
Health Science Center at Houston who is credited with being the chief architect 
of the ADA,” “[p]eople with disabilities . . . who are skilled, trained and ready 
to work simply can’t get in the door to begin with.”32 From the ADA’s passage 
in 1990 to 2010, the percentage of disabled people not working remains un-
changed.33 In 2018, only 19.1 percent of the disabled population was employed 
compared to 65.9 percent of the nondisabled population.34 Jobless rates are 
 
27  Id. (counting 8 million SSI recipients in 2017); 2017 SSA ANN. STAT. REP. ON SOC. SEC. 
DISABILITY INS. PROGRAM, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2017/di_asr17 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPU6-VC3U] (noting SSDI benefits were paid to 10.1 million people 
in 2017, averaging $1,196.87 per month); 2018 SSA SSI ANN. STAT. REP., https://www.ssa.g 
ov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi_asr/2018/background.html [https://perma.cc/H89W-GDGF] 
 (observing monthly SSI benefits averaged $551 per month in 2018). 
28  Jon C. Dubin, Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and Bureaucrat-
ically Rational Gap-Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security Administra-
tion’s Disability Programs, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937, 940 (2010) (describing “Yale Law Pro-
fessor Jerry Mashaw’s bureaucratic rationality model of administrative justice” as 
privileging “centrally formulated bureaucratic decisionmaking over more individualized ap-
proaches”); see JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 117 (1983). 
29  LAURA ROTHSTEIN & ANN C. MCGINLEY, DISABILITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 
11 (6th ed. 2017). 
30  Disability Policy & History: Statement Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. 
Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Edward D. Berkowitz, Chair, 
Department of History, George Washington University) [hereinafter Berkowitz Statement], 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/edberkdib.html [https://perma.cc/Q3PY-CA7U] (describing 
how laws like the ADA changed the landscape for people with disabilities, so that new levels 
of activities are available to them that were not available before these laws were enacted). 
31  Woodruff, supra note 2. 
32  The ADA at 25: Important Gains, but Gaps Remain, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Aug. 7, 
2015), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-gaps-that-remain-as-the-ada-turns-2 
5/ [https://perma.cc/S7R2-JJJS]. 
33  Woodruff, supra note 2. 
34  News Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat., Persons with a Disability: Labor Force Characteris-
tics—2019 (Feb. 26, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/disabl.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5GJ6-LKLX] (also noting, that in 2018, the unemployment rate was 8.0 
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higher for persons with disabilities regardless of age or education level.35 Ap-
proximately two-thirds of people with disabilities want to work.36 
Social Security disability programs “serve the American public by provid-
ing a vital safety net for . . . some of the most vulnerable members of society.”37 
People with disabilities have been described as “lead[ing] their lives in an in-
tolerable state of isolation and dependence,” as “victims of widespread discrim-
ination,” and as “a severely disadvantaged segment of society.”38 Social Securi-
ty benefits are a “lifeline when people are struck by a serious medical 
condition[(s)],”39 and are also “vital to the Nation’s economy.”40 The SSA op-
erates two different disability benefits programs that pay benefits to the disa-
bled—the SSDI program and the SSI program.41 Both programs use the same 
disability determination process (discussed below), but their objectives and 
funding are different.42 
 
percent for disabled people and 3.7 percent for nondisabled, and “[u]nemployed persons are 
those who did not have a job, were available for work, and were actively looking for a job in 
the 4 weeks preceding the survey”). 
35  Id. (noting “[a]cross all educational attainment groups, unemployment rates for persons 
with a disability were higher than those for persons without a disability,” and “[a]cross all 
age groups, . . . persons with a disability were more likely to be out of the labor force than 
those with no disability”). 
36  Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of 
a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 421–22 (1991) 
(noting that “[t]wo-thirds of those not working want to work” and “about 8.2 million people 
with disabilities want to work but cannot find a job”; also noting that “three-fourths of busi-
ness managers affirmed that people with disabilities often encounter job discrimination from 
employers” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting HARRIS (LOUIS) & 
ASSOCIATES, THE ICD SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS 12 (1987))); see also 
Frank Griffin, Author, Personal Experience (Years of orthopedic surgical practice consistent-
ly revealed that the majority of patients with disabilities in my practice wanted to return to 
work to maintain their standard of living and avoid taking a “handout.”). 
37  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
38  Burgdorf, supra note 36, at 416–17, 435–36. 
39  Social Security Safeguards Our Most Vulnerable Citizens, SOC. SEC. UPDATE ARCHIVE 
(Soc. Sec. Admin.), Aug. 2019, https://www.ssa.gov/news/newsletter/archive.html#2019 [htt 
ps://perma.cc/5NFF-P2MP]. 
40  Social Security Testimony Before Congress: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means and Subcomm. on the Cts., Com. & Admin. L. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Michael J. Astrue, Comm’r, So-
cial Security Administration), [hereinafter SSA’s Astrue Statement], https://www.ssa.gov/legi 
slation/testimony_071111.html [https://perma.cc/QCY2-726L]. 
41  Javier Meseguer, Outcome Variation in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program: 
The Role of Primary Diagnoses, 73 SOC. SEC. BULL. 39, 40 (2013), https://www.ssa.gov/poli 
cy/docs/ssb/v73n2/v73n2p39.html [https://perma.cc/A5UC-MGWS]; Barnhart v. Walton, 
535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Title II disability insurance benefits); 42 
U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (Title XVI supplemental security income). 
42  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 40. 
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The SSDI program was enacted in 195643 and “provides benefits to disa-
bled workers who are younger than their respective full retirement ages . . . to 
their spouses [and/or] surviving disabled spouses, and [to their] disabled chil-
dren.”44 SSDI is “funded through payroll tax contributions and is designed to 
protect workers contributing to the program.”45 SSDI’s purpose is to “replace 
part of a worker’s earnings” when a physical or mental impairment prevents the 
person from working.46 The worker must meet eligibility requirement for SSDI 
benefits.47 Once allowed, “[d]isability benefits continue for as long as the bene-
ficiary remains disabled or reaches full retirement age, in which case there is a 
conversion to retirement benefits.”48 When SSDI was passed, lawmakers 
agreed to “let[] the states, rather than the federal government, make the initial 
determinations of disability.”49 
In contrast, the SSI program is funded by general revenues and is not con-
tributory.50 SSI is a “program of last resort” for the aged, blind, and disabled.51 
SSI “has no employment or contribution requirements, but imposes strict in-
come and asset limits.”52 SSI’s “main goal” is to “guarantee a minimal level of 
income to the poorest of the aged, blind, or disabled population.”53 SSI began 
in 1975, and “policymakers reflexively assigned welfare beneficiaries to the 
administrative apparatus already established [nineteen years earlier] to adminis-
ter SSDI benefits.”54 Therefore, the two programs are administered via the 
same process “us[ing] a common definition of disability.”55 
To qualify for benefits, the claimant must be “disabled.”56 Under the Social 
Security Act, “disability” is defined by both programs as “inability to engage 
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 
 
43  Berkowitz Statement, supra note 30; 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. 
44  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 40 (noting that SSDI was enacted in 1956 and SSI in 1972); 
Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 797 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 
45  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 40. 
46  Id. at 39. 
47  Id. at 41 (explaining “[e]ligibility for [SSDI] benefits requires a worker to be insured, 
younger than his or her full retirement age, and to meet the definition of disability. The ap-
plicant must have worked long enough in employment covered by Social Security (approxi-
mately 10 years) and recently enough (about 5 of the past 10 years)”). 
48  Id.; Berkowitz Statement, supra note 30. 
49  Berkowitz Statement, supra note 30. 
50  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 40. 
51  Id. at 39. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. at 40. 
54  Berkowitz Statement, supra note 30. 
55  Id. 
56  See 42 U.S.C. § 1382. 
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than 12 months.”57 The SSA regulations specifically state that “activities like 
taking care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies, therapy, school attendance, 
club activities, [and] social programs” are not generally considered “substantial 
gainful activity.”58 Yet, as discussed below in detail, ALJs routinely deny 
claims based upon these activities.59 Some judges have denied up to 96 percent 
of claims.60 Denial of social security benefits is considered by some claimants 
to be a “death sentence” because without the benefits they cannot afford the 
basic necessities of life.61 
This paper examines implicit biases present in the SSA disability determi-
nation process revealed by the use of discriminatory “zombie factors”62 by ad-
judicators. Zombie factors are judicial rules related to activity restrictions that 
define disability in ways that are so restrictive they could virtually only be met 
by a “will-less,” supernatural, un-dead being with only a “semblance of life” 
(i.e., like fictitious “zombies”)—such as living without food, without personal 
hygiene or a clean home, without significant movement/exercise, without social 
interaction, without happiness provided by any recreational activity, and with-
out other semblances of human life.63 Use of zombie factors as evidence to de-
ny disability claims perpetuates prejudicial stereotypes that suggest that people 
with real work disabilities are so incapacitated that they are unable to provide 
self-care and therefore, must require institutionalization or be dependent upon 
others. While some ALJ disability opinions do not rest on zombie factors alone, 
 
57  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 
58  20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(c) (2019). 
59  See infra Part I. 
60  HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, ADMIN CONF. OF THE U.S., ACHIEVING GREATER 
CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND 
SUGGESTED REFORMS 15 (2013) (noting that “[t]he lowest and highest allowance rates (4% 
and 98%, respectively) very nearly spanned the full range of possible values”). 
61  Terrence McCoy, 597 Days. And Still Waiting., WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), https://ww 
w.washingtonpost.com/sf/local/2017/11/20/10000-people-died-waiting-for-a-disability-decis 
ion-in-the-past-year-will-he-be-next/ [https://perma.cc/N7D3-NTV9] (describing how a per-
son with no health insurance considered another denial a “death sentence”). 
62  This is a new term coined by the author, and first defined in detail here. The author previ-
ously used the term in his article entitled “Recognizing Pearls in the Medical Record of Mer-
itorious Social Security Disability Cases.” Frank Griffin, Recognizing Pearls in the Medical 
Record of Meritorious Social Security Disability Cases, 53 ARK. LAW., Winter 2018, at 34, 
35. 
63  Zombie, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/zombie [https://perma.cc/ 
9UPG-VKW3] (defining a “zombie” as “the body of a dead person given the semblance of 
life, but mute and will-less”); Zombie, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.co 
m/dictionary/zombie [https://perma.cc/JMK8-QWNX] (defining a “zombie” as “a will-less 
and speechless human . . . held to have died and been supernaturally reanimated” or “a per-
son held to resemble the so-called walking dead”); Zombie, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/232982?redirectedFrom=zombie#eid [https://perma.cc/48 
XU-FH3T] (defining a “zombie” as “a soulless corpse”). 
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the use of such factors to deny claims reinforces bias and stereotypes and con-
tributes to unfair outcomes in many SSA disability determinations. 
I. INABILITY TO LIVE INDEPENDENTLY OR PARTICIPATE IN MAINSTREAM LIFE 
AS “ZOMBIE FACTORS” IN SSA DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS 
Over time, our understanding of what it means to be disabled has 
evolved—so it is not surprising that an SSA disability system conceived in the 
1930s and developed in the 1950s is having growing pains.64 America has a 
long history of segregating and isolating people with disabilities, keeping them 
“out of sight, out of mind.”65 In colonial times, families were expected to take 
care of their relatives with disabilities, and some families chose to “hide or dis-
own their disabled members or allow them to die.”66 By the 1820s, “protective 
isolation[ism]” or “warehousing” was embraced in a “shift towards more orga-
nized, institutionalized care,” but abuse and neglect of institutionalized people 
emerged on a “massive scale.”67 From 1920 to 1960, “the development of wel-
fare . . . programs as an alternative to total care institutions” was underway to 
provide “financial support for the retirement of individuals with disabilities.”68 
Paternalistic medical models of disability have fallen into disfavor with 
modern disability rights advocates “maintain[ing] that people with disabili-
ties . . . have the right to govern their lives, and . . . that the proper goal of pub-
lic policy is the creation of meaningful equal opportunity.”69 The integration of 
people with disabilities into mainstream society requires the “elimination of at-
titudinal . . . [and] policy . . . barriers” (like the attitudes and policies demon-
strated by SSA adjudicators described below in this article).70 In 1973, the idea 
of societal integration of people with disabilities was recognized for the first 
time from a legal perspective when “the exclusion and segregation of people 
with disabilities was [first] viewed as discrimination” “with the passage of Sec-
tion 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act.”71 The regulations issued for the Reha-
bilitation Act formed the basis for the ADA.72 At the ADA’s signing, President 
 
64  Berkowitz Statement, supra note 30 (explaining that the “disability system developed in 
the 1930’s and created during the political conflicts of the 1950’s and 1970’s should [be ex-
pected to] experience strains after nearly half a century of operation”). 
65  Mayerson, supra note 3. 
66  ADA NAT’L NETWORK, Findings, Purpose, & History, ADA 30 YEARS, https://www.adaa 
nniversary.org/findings_purpose [https://perma.cc/LBT9-B9BM]. 
67  Id. 
68  Id.; ROTHSTEIN & MCGINLEY, supra note 29, at 10 (referencing EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, 
DISABLED POLICY: AMERICA’S PROGRAMS FOR THE HANDICAPPED (1987)). 
69  ADA NAT’L NETWORK, supra note 66. 
70  Id. 
71  Mayerson, supra note 3 (also noting that “Section 504 was . . . historic because for the 
first time people with disabilities were viewed as a class—a minority group” and that class 
status “has been critical in the development of the movement and advocacy efforts”). 
72  Id. 
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George H.W. Bush described the ADA as the beginning of a “bright new era of 
equality, independence, and freedom” for people with disabilities ensuring 
“equal opportunity and access to the mainstream of American life.”73 
According to the CDC, 61 million American adults are living with a disa-
bility,74 but only around 2.5 million apply for disability benefits each year.75 
Those who apply deserve fair consideration of their claims free from discrimi-
natory biases and stereotypes. The SSA acknowledges, “[i]t is our obligation 
to provide every person who comes before our agency . . . a timely, legally 
sound, policy-compliant decision.”76 Yet, ALJs and the court system often 
show implicit bias that people with work disabilities must be unable to live in-
dependently and unable to participate in simple mainstream activities because 
their opinions often require successful claimants to be (1) dependent and (2) 
isolated and segregated from mainstream life. 
A. Requiring Dependency to Qualify for Disability Benefits 
 In order to survive independently, all people—including people with disa-
bilities—must be able to perform “activities of daily living” (ADLs). Accord-
ing to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), ADLs “include 
bathing or showering, dressing, getting in and out of bed or a chair, walking, 
using the toilet, and eating.”77 ADLs are “essential and routine aspects of self-
care,” and the inability to perform ADLs leads to institutionalization, depend-
ency, or death.78 The CDC estimates that only “6.8 percent of people with a 
disability have an independent living disability with difficulty doing errands 
alone,” and only “3.6 percent of people with a disability have a self-care disa-
bility with difficulty dressing or bathing.”79 In other words, 93.2 percent of 
 
73  ADA NAT’L NETWORK, supra note 66. 
74  Disability Impacts All of Us, supra note 25; Okoro et al., supra note 25, at 887. 
75  See SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
76  Id. 
77  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Research, Statistics, Data & Systems, Appen-
dix B 200 (2008), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/MC 
BS/downloads/2008_Appendix_B.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5RH-RV7D]; see also Peter F. 
Edemekong et al., Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), EUR. PUBMED CENT., https://europepmc 
.org/article/nbk/nbk470404#free-full-text [https://perma.cc/QL9E-7VUK] (noting that “[t]he 
activities of daily living (ADLs) are both essential and routine aspects of self-care” and de-
scribing “[t]he six essential ADLs [as] the ability to be able to independently eat, dress, walk 
or transfer from one position to another, bathe, and toilet, and maintaining bowel and bladder 
continence”). 
78  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 77; Edemekong et al., supra note 
77 (“Inability to accomplish essential activities of daily living may lead to unsafe conditions 
and poor quality of life; possibly serving as criteria to consider home care assistance or 
placement in assisted living, skilled care, or long-term care. Placement in a facility due to 
declining ADL’s is often a difficult decision made collaboratively by the patient, significant 
others, and the healthcare team.”). 
79  Disability Impacts All of Us, supra note 25; Okoro et al., supra note 25. 
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people with disabilities can live independently and run errands alone, and 96.4 
percent can dress and bathe themselves.80 
 Some courts have repeatedly said that ADLs should not be used as evi-
dence to deny claimants benefits. For example, Judge Posner pointed out the 
“critical differences between activities of daily living and activities in a full-
time job,” including the facts that (1) “a person has more flexibility in schedul-
ing” their ADLs than a job, (2) a person can “get help from other persons” 
when necessary to perform ADLs more commonly than in a job, and (3) a per-
son “is not held to a minimum standard of performance” in performing ADLs, 
“as she would be by an employer.”81 In addition, the SSA regulations specifi-
cally state that “activities like taking care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies, 
therapy, school attendance, club activities, [and] social programs” are not gen-
erally considered “substantial gainful activity.”82 The Eighth Circuit has rein-
forced this by saying, “[t]his court has repeatedly stated that a person’s ability 
to engage in personal activities such as cooking, cleaning, and hobbies does not 
constitute substantial evidence that he or she has the functional capacity to en-
gage in substantial gainful activity.”83 However, ALJs continue to rule other-
wise, and while sometimes the courts correct them—many times the courts af-
firm their judgments.84 
1. ALJ Bias: Activities of Daily Living as Evidence of Non-disability 
ADLs are routinely among the factors listed by ALJs as evidence to deny 
claims by discounting claimants’ credibility and the opinions of their treating 
physicians. ADLs often listed include the ability to live alone, to prepare food 
(i.e., cook, obtain groceries, wash dishes), to bathe, to put on clothing, among 
others. These “zombie factors”85 expose the ALJ’s implicit bias that people 
with true work disabilities are unable to take care of their own basic needs and 
live independently. 
 
80  See Disability Impacts All of Us, supra note 25. 
81  Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). 
82  20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(c) (2019). 
83  Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 588–89 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Hogg v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 
276, 278 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
84  The judicial record is replete with examples of ALJs and courts using these factors; only a 
few demonstrative cases are discussed here. 
85  Supra Introduction (“Zombie factors are judicial rules related to activity restrictions that 
define disability in ways that are so restrictive they could virtually only be met by a ‘will-
less,’ supernatural, un-dead being with only a ‘semblance of life’ (i.e., like fictitious ‘zom-
bies’)—such as living without food, without personal hygiene or a clean home, without sig-
nificant movement/exercise, without social interaction, without happiness provided by any 
recreational activity, and without other semblances of human life. Use of zombie factors as 
evidence to deny disability claims perpetuates prejudicial stereotypes that suggest that peo-
ple with real work disabilities are so incapacitated that they are unable to provide self-care 
and therefore, must require institutionalization or be dependent upon others.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
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First, for decades, some ALJs explicitly demonstrate a disability dependen-
cy bias by listing the fact that claimants live alone among evidence of a lack of 
disability;86 this standard basically requires claimants to be dependent upon 
others or institutionalized to qualify for disability benefits. For example, one 
ALJ listed “the facts that [the claimant] lives alone [and] independently takes 
care of his personal needs” as being inconsistent with his complaints and medi-
cal record of disability.87 Another ALJ “noted that plaintiff lives alone [and] 
can dress himself” among evidence to deny his claim.88 Another ALJ used the 
facts that the “claimant . . . lives alone and cares for his own personal bathing” 
as factors to deny his claim.89 The Eighth Circuit even recently reinforced this 
idea when it found substantial evidence in the fact that the claimant was “able 
to perform . . . personal care tasks . . . and live alone.”90 Living alone has been 
used extensively as a factor in denying claims for decades.91 
Second, food preparation—including buying food at the grocery store, 
cooking, and washing dishes—is often cited by ALJs as a reason for denying 
disability claims. For example, one ALJ included the claimant’s “ability to pre-
pare meals . . . and shop for groceries [on a motorized cart]” among the factors 
that “belie his assertion of incapacity”;92 in other words, because the claimant 
can cook and shop for groceries, he is lying about his disability according to 
this ALJ. Another ALJ included the facts that the claimant was able to “cook” 
and “grocery shop” as substantial evidence factors to reject the opinion of the 
claimant’s treating physician, to reject the claimant’s subjective complaints of 
disabling pain, and to support a determination that the claimant was not disa-
bled.93 Another ALJ “attached great significance to the fact that [the claim-
 
86  See, e.g., Coren v. Calvin, 253 F. Supp. 3d 356, 360 (D. Mass. 2017) (finding that the 
ALJ’s denial of benefits was proper where that ALJ “credited evidence that [the claimant] is 
able to live independently”); see also Fulwood v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 540, 543 (D.D.C. 
1984) (noting the fact that the ALJ relied on the fact that the claimant “lives alone” to dis-
count his credibility). 
87  Bryant v. Colvin, 861 F.3d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). 
88  Smith v. Apfel, 69 F. Supp. 2d 370, 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (emphasis added). 
89  Van Laningham v. Astrue, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (emphasis add-
ed). 
90  Twyford v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 929 F.3d 512, 517 (8th Cir. 2019) (emphasis add-
ed). 
91  See, e.g., Coren, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 360 (finding that the ALJ’s denial of benefits was 
proper where that ALJ “credited evidence that [the claimant] is able to live independently”); 
see also Fulwood, 594 F. Supp. at 543 (noting the fact that the ALJ relied on the fact that the 
claimant “lives alone” to discount his credibility). 
92  Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
93  Pardee v. Astrue, 631 F. Supp. 2d 200, 206, 210–11 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (emphasis added) 
(noting that claimant’s testimony that she was “able to . . . cook [and] . . . grocery shop” 
were factors supporting an ability to do “light work” and was substantial evidence to reject 
the opinions of her treating physician regarding her RFC and reject her subjective complaints 
of disabling pain). 
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ant] . . . is able to . . . feed, shelter and clothe herself . . . and is not prevented by 
her condition from . . . cooking.”94 Cleaning up after a meal is also a disqualify-
ing factor for some ALJs who frequently list the fact that the claimant “washes 
dishes” among the evidence they use to deny claims.95 Food preparation is of-
ten used as substantial evidence in Social Security disability determinations, 
and only a tiny fraction of case law is mentioned here.96 
 Third, personal hygiene is also often used as substantial evidence against 
claimants by ALJs. For example, one ALJ listed the claimant’s ability to “take 
a shower” among factors used to ignore the claimant’s doctor’s opinions.97 An-
other ALJ denied a disabled veteran’s claim listing the fact that he was “able to 
shower” among evidence.98 Another ALJ used the claimant’s ability to “take a 
 
94  Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
95  Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
96  E.g., Twyford v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 929 F.3d 512, 517 (8th Cir. 2019) (agreeing 
that claimant’s ability to “shop for groceries” was substantial evidence for denial of claim); 
Rusin v. Berryhill, 726 F. App’x 837, 840 (2d Cir. 2018) (ruling that severe limitations 
claimed by the plaintiff were inconsistent with the plaintiff’s report “that he cooked simple 
meals daily, left the house daily, can drive, and shopped for groceries every two weeks”); 
Youngblood v. Berryhill, 734 F. App’x 496, 499 (9th Cir. 2018) (including “grocery shop-
ping” among “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” supporting an ALJ’s denial of bene-
fits); Singleton v. Colvin, 646 F. App’x 509, 511 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that the ALJ relied 
on the claimants ability to “complete tasks . . . such as grocery shopping . . . as evidence that 
[the claimant’s] impairments were not as severe as she claimed”); Cindy F. v. Berryhill, 367 
F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1212 (D. Or. 2019) (stating, “[t]he ALJ found that Plaintiff’s daily activi-
ties [we]re not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling 
symptoms and limitations,” and mentioning the claimant’s ability to “prepare meals daily,” 
“shop for groceries once a week,” and the fact that she “did not need help with . . . eating” as 
evidence of non-disability); Yates v. Colvin, 940 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670, 673–74 (S.D. Ohio 
2013) (mentioning “preparing meals” as a disqualifying factor); Lewis v. Barnhart, 460 F. 
Supp. 2d 771, 786 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (listing among substantial evidence the fact that the 
claimant “is able to cook” and “grocery shop once per month”); Bergfeld v. Barnhart, 361 F. 
Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (D. Ariz. 2005) (observing the ALJ implied that the claimant was not 
disabled because her daily activities included “cooking, . . . and grocery shopping”). See, 
e.g., Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 865, 868–70 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding the ALJ consid-
ered factors like “cooking, . . . washing dishes, and grocery shopping” in rejecting treating 
physician’s opinion and in rejecting claimant’s subjective complaints of pain); Velez-Pantoja 
v. Astrue, 786 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (D.P.R. 2010) (including among substantial evidence the 
fact that the claimant could “prepare light meals”); Ferguson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. 
Servs., 919 F. Supp. 1012, 1021–22 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (including as factors listed as substan-
tial evidence the fact that the claimant could “cook several meals daily; wash dishes by 
hand; . . . [and] do the grocery shopping”). 
97  Helms v. Berryhill, 362 F. Supp. 3d 294, 302 (W.D.N.C. 2019) (emphasis added) (finding 
the ALJ erred in ignoring physician’s opinion using as undermining factors including the 
fact that the claimant could “take a shower”). 
98  Hunley v. Cohen, 288 F. Supp. 537, 538, 541 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (emphasis added) (noting 
as a factor that the claimant “is able to shower” in denying benefits to a claimant with a Vet-
eran’s Administration rating of “permanent and total disability”). 
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shower and dress herself” to deny benefits.99 Still another ALJ included the 
claimant’s ability to “shower, bathe, and dress” as factors against finding disa-
bility.100 Another ALJ listed the fact that the claimant could “bathe and dress 
normally” among evidence for denying her claim.101 Again, the judicial record 
contains many examples.102 
 Other ADLs used as factors to deny disability benefits range from brushing 
teeth to making the bed. For example, one ALJ relied on the claimant’s ability 
to “complete tasks . . . such as . . . making the bed, and folding clothes—as evi-
dence that [the claimant’s] impairments were not as severe as she claimed.”103 
Another ALJ was extremely specific and considered the claimant’s ability to 
“button[] a blouse” and “brush[] [her] teeth and hair” as factors in denying 
her claim.104 Many examples exist.105 
2. Judicial Bias: Inconsistently Reinforcing and Chastising ALJs for 
Using ADLs as Evidence for Non-disability 
Courts (including the Circuit courts) often both chastise and reinforce ALJs 
for using ADLs as evidence. These confusing and contrary decisions may be 
because implicit bias can be overcome with deliberate and careful consideration 
to avoid “cognitive shortcut[s].”106 So, a busy ALJ or court might make a hur-
 
99  Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 865, 874 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (finding re-
versible error where the ALJ considered factors like her ability to “take a shower and dress 
herself” in rejecting treating physician’s opinion and in rejecting claimant’s subjective com-
plaints of pain). 
100  Bonilla Mojica v. Berryhill, 397 F. Supp. 3d 513, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (emphasis added) 
(finding among substantial evidence that the claimant “can shower, bathe, and dress” to sup-
port denying her claim at step 3 under medical listings). 
101  Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). 
102  See, e.g., Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 365–66 (7th Cir. 2004) (including as factors in 
denial the fact that the claimant “able to bathe herself, but that she has problems getting out 
of the bathtub and therefore takes showers”); Velez-Pantoja v. Astrue, 786 F. Supp. 2d 464, 
469 (D.P.R. 2010) (including among substantial evidence the fact that the claimant could 
“shower and dress himself”); Pardee v. Astrue, 631 F. Supp. 2d 200, 211 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(noting that claimant’s testimony that she was “able to shower” was a factor supporting an 
ability to do “light work” and was substantial evidence to reject the opinions of her treating 
physician and her subjective complaints of disabling pain). 
103  Singleton v. Colvin, 646 F. App’x 509, 511 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). 
104  Ferguson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 919 F. Supp. 1012, 1021 (E.D. Tex. 1996) 
(emphasis added). 
105  See, e.g., Youngblood v. Berryhill, 734 F. App’x 496, 499 (9th Cir. 2018) (including 
“cleaning” among “convincing reasons” supporting ALJs denial of benefits); Craft v. Astrue, 
539 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting the ALJ concluded that the claimant’s four 
minutes of vacuuming each day “belie[d] his assertion of incapacity”). 
106  Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1200–01 
(1995) (discussing cognitive shortcuts as the representative heuristic); see also Tessa E. S. 
Charlesworth & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Patterns of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: I. Long-
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ried negative decision in one instance due to time constraints, but make a dif-
ferent positive decision using the same facts on a different day with more time 
to reflect.107 
First, courts are sometimes supportive of using ADLs for evidence. For ex-
ample, one New York court specifically noted that the claimant’s “activities of 
daily living, including light cooking and shopping, . . . were appropriate factors 
for the ALJ to consider in weighing the medical opinions and other evidence of 
record . . . , and do suggest a level of functioning and stamina that is incon-
sistent with the extent of [the claimant’s] claimed limitations, as well as with 
the more extreme limitations opined by [the testifying physicians].”108 Like-
wise, a Texas court found the ALJ’s negative “credibility findings [were] sup-
ported by the evidence in the record” like the fact that the claimant testified that 
“he was able to cook” and “lift a gallon of milk.”109 Similarly, a court in Ohio 
found that “grocery shop[ping] on a weekly basis” was a disqualifying fac-
tor.110 Also, a court in Maine affirmed the ALJ’s denial of benefits because the 
claimant was “capable of partak[ing] in several activities, such as preparing her 
own meals . . . and shop[ping] in stores for basic necessities.”111 
The Circuit courts also often support the use of basic ADLs as evidence to 
deny claims. For example, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling 
where the ALJ’s “eminently reasonable credibility determination” (“due special 
deference”) was based on the fact that the claimant “occasionally cook[ed] for 
herself” and “[went] grocery shopping with assistance.”112 The Fifth Circuit 
blessed the ALJ’s evidence in another example noting that the claimant “admit-
ted that she was able to dress and bathe herself and that she regularly washed 
the dirty dishes”; the Fifth circuit said “[claimant] herself related at the admin-
istrative hearing that she [was] able to care for her personal needs, cooks meals, 
[and drove] her car once or twice a week.”113 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit sup-
ported an ALJ’s findings that “‘regularly’ perform[ing] the activities of self-
care, such as bathing/showering, dressing, shaving, and hair care” were signs 
 
Term Change and Stability From 2007 to 2016, 30 PSYCH. SCI. 174, 174 (2019) (revealing 
that implicit bias can change over time). 
107  Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation 
in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1941–42 (2009) 
(“Although social psychologists frequently note the difficulties of controlling stereotypes 
that are by definition unconscious and automatic, most experts conclude that stereotypes are 
not permanent, but rather alterable. The two variables most often noted are (1) effort, and (2) 
situational context.”). 
108  Burkey v. Colvin, 284 F. Supp. 3d 420, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
109  Collins v. Astrue, 493 F. Supp. 2d 858, 876–77 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (emphasis added). 
110  Yates v. Colvin, 940 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670, 674 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (emphasis added). 
111  Smith v. Berryhill, 370 F. Supp. 3d 282, 285–86 (D. Mass. 2019) (emphasis added). 
112  Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
113  Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). 
21 NEV. L.J. 161 
Fall 2020] IMPLICIT DISABILITY BIAS 177 
 
that the claimant was not disabled.114 Likewise, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
ALJ’s findings that severe limitations claimed by the plaintiff were not con-
sistent with the claimant’s report that he “cooked simple meals daily, left the 
house daily, [could] drive, and shopped for groceries every two weeks.”115 Ex-
amples abound.116 
Second, courts often strikingly contradict themselves and forcefully state 
that basic ADLs are not substantial evidence to be used to deny claims. For ex-
ample, in remanding one case, the Seventh Circuit chastised the lower court 
saying, “[w]e have cautioned the Social Security Administration against plac-
ing undue weight on a claimant’s household activities in assessing the claim-
ant’s ability to hold a job outside the home.”117 Similarly, the Third Circuit 
quipped that the Social Security Administration does not define “disability” in 
terms requiring a claimant to “vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms 
of human and social activity” and chided that “statutory disability does not 
mean that a claimant must be a quadriplegic or an amputee.”118 Similarly, the 
Eighth Circuit has noted, “[w]e have repeatedly held . . . that the ability to do 
activities such as light housework and visiting with friends provides little or no 
support for the finding that a claimant can perform full-time competitive 
work.”119 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit found that evidence that the “claimant 
washed dishes, did light cooking, read, watched TV, visited with his mother, 
and drove to shop for groceries” was “not substantial evidence of the ability to 
do full-time, competitive work.”120 Further, the court said the fact that the 
claimant “trie[d] to maintain her home and [did] her best to engage in ordinary 
life activities . . . in no way direct[ed] a finding that she [was] able to engage in 
light work.”121 
Lower courts also often express the same findings. For example, one court 
noted, “[m]erely because an individual is somewhat mobile and can perform 
some simple functions, such as driving, dishwashing, shopping, and sweeping 
the floor, does not mean that he is able to engage in substantial gainful activi-
 
114  Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 852 (8th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). 
115  Rusin v. Berryhill, 726 F. App’x 837, 840 (2d Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). 
116  See, e.g., Youngblood v. Berryhill, 734 F. App’x 496, 499 (9th Cir. 2018) (including 
“cooking” among reasons supporting ALJs denial of benefits); Merichko v. Astrue, 363 F. 
App’x 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that a claimant who “does her own weekly grocery 
shopping and carries her own bags” and “uses public transportation” as disqualifying); 
Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 2006) (mentioning “shopping for groceries” 
among factors considered to be substantial evidence). 
117  Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Mendez v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
118  Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971 (3d Cir. 1981). 
119  Baumgarten v. Chater, 75 F.3d 366, 369 (8th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Hogg v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
120  Draper v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Rainey v. Dep’t of 
Health & Hum. Servs., 48 F.3d 292, 293 (8th Cir.1995)). 
121  Id. 
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ty”;122 the court went on to point out, “[t]hese tasks can be performed intermit-
tently, when the individual is not experiencing severe symptoms, and do not 
require the sustained effort necessary for any substantial, sustained and regular 
gainful employment.”123 Another court noted, “a claimant need not be totally 
helpless in order to be entitled to benefits”; the court went on to say, “[i]t 
should go without saying that [the claimant] can handle these limited tasks—if 
she were unable to do so, she would be truly ‘helpless’ in the literal sense of the 
word.”124 Another district court found that an ALJ improperly failed to “afford 
controlling weight to” the testifying physician’s opinion, without good reason, 
where the claimant reported that she could independently “dress[] . . . bath[e], 
groom[], cook[], clean[], do[] laundry, shop[], manag[e] money, and driv[e]” 
while undergoing chemotherapy.125 Likewise, another lower court explained, 
“[t]he Social Security Act does not require that claimants be utterly incapacitat-
ed to be eligible for benefits.”126 
3. ADLs Measure Ability and Will to Survive—Not Employability 
ADL’s are necessary for survival, so all people living somewhat autono-
mously must perform at least some of these activities to stay alive. The “Listing 
of Impairments” includes over one hundred impairments, and claimants “[who] 
‘meet’ the Listings are allowed [disability benefits], based solely on medical 
criteria” without further evaluation.127 “Most of the listed impairments are per-
manent or expected to result in death,” and many have specific rules that apply 
to assessment.128 Examples of listed impairments include breast cancer,129 leu-
kemia,130 and major dysfunction of a joint with gross anatomical deformity.131 
Even most people with disabilities among those in the Listing of Impair-
ments perform their ADLs. For example, “most cancer survivors accomplish 
 
122  Fulwood v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 540, 543 (D.D.C. 1984). 
123  Id. 
124  Amick v. Celebrezze, 253 F. Supp. 192, 196 (D.S.C. 1966) (emphasis added. 
125  Insalaco v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 366 F. Supp. 3d 401, 408–10 (W.D.N.Y. 2019). 
126  Bergfeld v. Barnhart, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (D. Ariz. 2005). 
127  20 C.F.R. § 404.1525 (2017) (The Listing of Impairments “describes for each of the ma-
jor body systems impairments that [the SSA] consider[s] to be severe enough to prevent an 
individual from doing any gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work 
experience”); BERNARD WIXON & ALEXANDER STRAND, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., RESEARCH AND 
STATISTICS NOTE NO. 2013-01, IDENTIFYING SSA’S SEQUENTIAL DISABILITY DETERMINATION 
STEPS USING ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 5 (2013), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/rsnotes/rsn2 
013-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2SA-DLJ6]; Listing of Impairments-Adult Listings (Part A), 
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/AdultListings.htm 
[https://perma.cc/92MA-YXZF]. 
128  20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(4) (2017). 
129  20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(13.10) (2017). 
130  20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(13.06). 
131  20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(1.02). 
21 NEV. L.J. 161 
Fall 2020] IMPLICIT DISABILITY BIAS 179 
 
[ADLs] without any problems” because “effectively completing activities of 
daily living indicates a very low level of function.”132 One cancer researcher 
noted that activities “such as performing household chores or going to the gro-
cery store to get food” are “not enough” to expose “functional problems” that 
“cause significant disability” when assessing cancer patients.133 In other words, 
ability to perform ADLs is not a good measure of function (and thus, employa-
bility). 
Whether or not the ALJ ultimately grants or denies the claim, ADLs are not 
a sign of ability to work. For example, a proper diet is just as important for dis-
abled people as for healthy people, so food preparation is essential to surviv-
al—including gathering of food (e.g., going to the grocery store), cooking the 
food, and washing the dishes. For example, under the List of Impairments, kid-
ney transplant recipients are recognized by the SSA as being disabled for one 
year after the transplant;134 the Transplant Society notes that “[t]here [is] abun-
dant data from the general population that a lifestyle that includes . . . a proper 
diet and avoidance of obesity improves longevity and quality of life,” and 
“[t]here is no reason not to believe that a proper diet can help prevent [cardio-
vascular disease] and other complications in [kidney transplant recipients] as in 
the general population.”135 The same—that one must eat a proper diet and avoid 
obesity to ensure longevity of lifealso applied to many other types of disabili-
ties that are undisputed by the SSA. 
Even back in the late 1980s before the ADA requirements for accessibility 
at grocery stores, eight-seven percent of people with disabilities shopped in 
grocery stores at least occasionally and 62 percent of people with disabilities 
went once per week.136 In order to have a proper diet, people with disabilities 
must prepare food to eat, which usually includes going to the grocery store, 
cooking/preparing the food, and cleaning up afterward (e.g., washing dishes). 
In addition, some type of transportation—possibly walking, driving, or taking 
public transportation—is often necessary to get to the grocery store or other 
food source. So, all of these activities are necessary and expected of most disa-
bled people. 
 
132  Julie K. Silver et al., Impairment-Driven Cancer Rehabilitation: An Essential Component 
of Quality Care and Survivorship, 63 CA: CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 296, 297 (2013), https:/ 
/acsjournals-onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/doi/full/10.3322/caac.21186 
[https://perma.cc/5BRA-EVGX]. 
133  Id. 
134  20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(6.04) (2017). 
135  Chapter 26: Lifestyle, 9 AM J. TRANSPLANTATION S110, S110 (Supp. 2009), https://tts.or 
g/kdigo/downloads/kdigo/S5-C26_Lifestyle.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS45-DRT5]. 
136  Burgdorf, supra note 36, at 423, 423 n.53 (reporting that “thirteen percent of persons 
with disabilities never shop in grocery stores”; so, 87 percent must shop sometimes; also not-
ing that “[a]bout six out of ten (62%) individuals with disabilities visit a grocery store at 
least once a week”). 
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Extraordinary food prep—for example, if the claimant is doing it in a way 
that demonstrates he or she could do it for pay—could rise to the level of sub-
stantial evidence in some cases, but the ALJ should distinguish the unusual 
characteristics about the food prep that makes it relevant to employability when 
using it as a factor to deny benefits. It is hardly surprising that disabled people 
find a way to get to a food source and prepare food, since food is necessary for 
survival; what is surprising is that many ALJs believe cooking, grocery shop-
ping, and washing dishes should be considered substantial evidence that a per-
son is not disabled.137 
Personal hygiene is also as important for people with disabilities as for 
healthy people. The CDC notes that “[m]any diseases and conditions can be 
prevented or controlled through appropriate personal hygiene and by frequently 
washing parts of the body and hair with soap and clean, running water.”138 The 
CDC also notes, “[g]ood body washing practices can prevent the spread of hy-
giene-related diseases” including body lice, chronic diarrhea, tooth decay, pin-
worms, scabies, and numerous other illnesses that could lead to further compli-
cations, poor quality of life, and possibly even death among people living with 
disabilities.139 The point that people must bathe and maintain personal hy-
giene—even people suffering from the worst disabilities—seems obvious and 
is not belabored here. The same can be said for many other ADLs sometimes 
cited by ALJs and courts.140 
B. Requiring Isolation and Segregation from Mainstream Life to Qualify for 
Disability Benefits 
 ALJs routinely list simple mainstream activities as evidence of a lack of 
disability even though “[t]hese tasks can be performed intermittently, when the 
individual is not experiencing severe symptoms, and do not require the sus-
tained effort necessary for any substantial, sustained and regular gainful em-
ployment.”141 Simple mainstream activities like going to church, watching tele-
vision, owning a pet, walking for exercise, sewing, fishing, and hunting are 
often listed by ALJs among evidence to deny claims.142 However, simple main-
stream activities include “flexibility in scheduling,” the possibility to “get help 
from other persons,” and no “minimum standard of performance”—unlike job 
 
137  See supra Section I.A.1. 
138  Body, Facial, & Dental Hygiene, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 26, 
2016), https://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/hygiene/body/index.html [https://perma.cc/TEP3-
F6LJ]. 
139  Id.; Hygiene-related Illnesses, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 26, 
2016), https://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/hygiene/disease/index.html [https://perma.cc/6MB 
K-Z5V9]. 
140  See infra Section I.B.1, B.2. 
141  Fulwood v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 540, 543 (D.D.C. 1984). 
142  See infra Section I.B.1. 
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requirements, as noted by Judge Posner.143 At least one ALJ even considered a 
claimant’s ability to “color[] in [a] coloring book[]” as evidence of employabil-
ity.144 
SSA regulations specifically state that “activities like . . . household tasks, 
hobbies, therapy, school attendance, club activities or social programs” are not 
generally considered “substantial gainful activity.”145 The Eighth Circuit ex-
plained, “the test [for evidence of the ability to engage in substantial gainful ac-
tivity] is whether the claimant has ‘the ability to perform the requisite physical 
acts day in and day out, in the sometimes competitive and stressful conditions 
in which real people work in the real world.’ ”146 The Fourth Circuit recognized 
that for an activity to be a substantial gainful activity “some degree of regulari-
ty should be inferred . . . [and when] a person’s activity may be frequently or 
transitorily restricted, [it] cannot be the premise for a finding of ability to en-
gage in any substantial gainful activity.”147 The Third Circuit similarly noted, 
“[i]t is well established that sporadic or transitory activity does not disprove 
disability,” and therefore, “even two sporadic occurrences such as hunting 
might indicate merely that the claimant was partially functional on two 
days.”148 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated, “the ability to do limited 
household chores, interspersed with rest, does not demonstrate the ability to 
work eight hours a day, five days a week, where it might be impossible to peri-
odically rest” and that claimants “should not be penalized for attempting to lead 
normal lives in the face of their limitations.”149 
1. ALJ Bias: Simple Mainstream Activities as Evidence of Non-disability 
 Simple mainstream activities often cited by ALJs as evidence of employa-
bility include voluntary physical activities (e.g., walking, attending church, 
owning a pet, household chores), recreational activities (e.g., social activities, 
family functions, fishing, hunting), voluntary mental activities (e.g., watching 
television, reading), and leaving the home (e.g., walking, driving, or taking 
public transportation).150 
 
143  Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). 
144  Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). 
145  20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (2017). 
146  Draper v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting McCoy v. Schweiker, 
683 F.2d 1138, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc)). 
147  Wilson v. Richardson, 455 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Ellerman v. Flemming, 188 F. Supp. 521, 526 (W.D. Mo. 1960)). 
148  Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971–72 (3d Cir. 1981). 
149  Bergfeld v. Barnhart, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1115 (D. Ariz. 2005). 
150  The judicial record is filled with examples for each of the categories and specific activi-
ties listed below (as well as other similar activities); only a few illustrative examples are dis-
cussed here. See, e.g., Butler v. Colvin, No. 2:15-CV-282, 2016 WL 2848883, at *7 (N.D. 
Ind. May 16, 2016) (even sexual activity is scrutinized with one ALJ concluding that a 
claimant’s “sexual activity was inconsistent with her alleged low back pain”). 
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 First, voluntary physical activities (e.g., walking, attending church, owning 
a pet, household chores) that are clearly sporadic and transitory—unlike job re-
quirements—are often included among disqualifying evidence. Short walks can 
be disqualifying. For example, one claimant’s “own admissions” that she could 
“read, walk short distances, and attend church twice weekly” were considered 
evidence to deny her claim for widow’s benefits.151 Another ALJ discredited 
the claimant’s credibility because “she can walk up to one block . . . [and] even 
drive” during her “one or two good days each week.”152 Going to church can be 
disqualifying. For example, one ALJ included the fact that the claimant “regu-
larly attended church” among evidence.153 ALJs frequently list “attend[ing] 
church services” among their evidence.154 Doing household tasks can be dis-
qualifying. An Ohio court affirmed an ALJ’s findings of non-disability and 
listed the fact that the claimant could do some “cleaning, sweeping, and general 
straightening up around the house”; the court included “taking out the trash” 
among substantial evidence to deny her claim.155 Another ALJ considered fac-
tors like “vacuuming[] [and] making the bed” in rejecting treating physician’s 
opinion and in rejecting claimant’s subjective complaints of pain.156 Owning 
pets can be disqualifying. For example, the Ninth Circuit noted that “taking 
care of her pets” was evidence to support denying benefits to a claimant.157 An-
other ALJ used the fact that the “claimant feeds and waters his dog” as a factor 
to deny his claim.158 
Second, sporadic recreational activities (e.g., social activities, family func-
tions, fishing, hunting) are often included among disqualifying evidence. For 
example, one ALJ discounted the claimant’s testimony because she could “en-
gage in social activities without much difficulty.”159 Another ALJ considered, 
among other things, the claimant’s ability to engage in “social activities” as ev-
idence of non-disability.160 Similarly, the Eighth circuit noted that the claim-
ant’s ability to “participate in family functions” was evidence for denial of the 
claim.161 Another ALJ found that a claimant’s ability to “go outside in the 
morning and do cat fishing” was substantial evidence to discredit the claimant’s 
 
151  Crosson v. Shalala, 907 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995). 
152  Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). 
153  Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992). 
154  See, e.g., Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2004); Velez-Pantoja v. Astrue, 
786 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (D.P.R. 2010) (including among substantial evidence the fact that 
the claimant could “go to church”). 
155  Yates v. Colvin, 940 F. Supp. 2d 664, 674 (S.D. Ohio 2013). 
156  Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 865 (7th Cir. 2000). 
157  Youngblood v. Berryhill, 734 F. App’x 496, 499 (9th Cir. 2018). 
158  Van Laningham v. Astrue, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (S.D. Iowa 2007). 
159  Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 590–91 (3d Cir. 2001). 
160  Shultes v. Berryhill, 758 F. App’x 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2018). 
161  Twyford v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 929 F.3d 512, 517 (8th Cir. 2019). 
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reported pain.162 Another ALJ considered a claimant’s “two sporadic occur-
rences” of going hunting as evidence he was not disabled.163 
Third, transient mental activities (e.g., watching television, reading) are of-
ten listed as evidence. Even “color[ing] in coloring books” has been viewed by 
an ALJ as evidence worth listing as a reason to discredit a claimant’s testimo-
ny.164 In Ohio, an ALJ mentioned “watching television” as a disqualifying fac-
tor.165 “Watching television, reading, [and] receiving visitors” were all consid-
ered substantial evidence by another ALJ.166 Yet another ALJ included “enjoys 
watching television” among factors in denying a claim.167 And another ALJ 
found that “playing cards[] [and] watching television . . . [had been] held in-
consistent with disabling pain.”168 The Ninth Circuit also found that “crochet-
ing, sewing, and learning new computer programs” were among “specific, clear 
and convincing reasons” supporting an ALJs denial of benefits.169 
Fourth, leaving home is evidence in favor of denying benefits according to 
many ALJs. Walking can be disqualifying. For example, another ALJ found 
that the claimant’s “ ‘daily walk’ . . . to the mailbox at the end of the driveway” 
was evidence of non-disability.170 Driving can be disqualifying. An Ohio court 
ruled that “driv[ing] a car” was a disqualifying factor.171 One court held that the 
ALJ’s credibility finding—based largely on the claimant’s ability to drive her 
boyfriend to work—was within the “great deference” to which ALJs are enti-
tled.172 Taking public transportation can be disqualifying. For example, one 
ALJ discounted the claimant’s testimony because she could “use public trans-
portation.”173 At least one ALJ nailed all three modes of leaving home in one 
case by including among evidence the fact that the claimant could “walk, drive, 
[and] use public transportation.”174 If a claimant cannot walk, drive, or use pub-
lic transportation and still qualify for benefits, then the SSA is basically saying 
that beneficiaries must be home-bound or institutionalized. 
 
162  Collins v. Astrue, 493 F. Supp. 2d 858, 876–77 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
163  Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971–72 (3d Cir. 1981). 
164  Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he ALJ rejected Orn’s testimony 
because his activities of ‘read[ing], watch[ing] television and color[ing] in coloring books’ 
‘indicate that he is more functional than alleged.’ ”). 
165  Yates v. Colvin, 940 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (S.D. Ohio 2013). 
166  Bergfeld v. Barnhart, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1115 (D. Ariz. 2005). 
167  Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2004). 
168  Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 696 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Riggins v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 
689, 693 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
169  Youngblood v. Berryhill, 734 F. App’x. 496, 499 (9th Cir. 2018). 
170  Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2008). 
171  Yates v. Colvin, 940 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (S.D. Ohio 2013). 
172  Samantha S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 385 F. Supp. 3d 174, 188 (N.D.N.Y. 2019). 
173  Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 590 (3d Cir. 2001). 
174  Velez-Pantoja v. Astrue, 786 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (D.P.R. 2010). 
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The judicial record is filled with examples of simple mainstream activities 
being used to disqualify claimants, and this article cites only a few representa-
tive examples to give the reader a feel for the degree of restriction present. 
2. Judiciary Bias: Inconsistently Reinforcing and Chastising ALJs for 
Using Simple Mainstream Activities as Evidence of Non-disability 
Similar to the pattern discussed above for ADLs, courts often both chastise 
and reinforce ALJs for using simple mainstream activities as evidence. To help 
show the arbitrary nature of the rulings even among the same court, this section 
will concentrate on one circuit court—the Eighth Circuit.175 Again, these con-
flicting and inconsistent results likely reflect an internal struggle with implicit 
bias.176 
In spite of its assertions otherwise,177 the Eighth Circuit has numerous cas-
es supporting the idea that simple mainstream activities are substantial evidence 
of lack of disability. For example in one case, the Eighth Circuit considered 
“the facts that [the claimant] lives alone, independently takes care of his per-
sonal needs, drives automobiles, shops, prepares meals, does his laundry, and 
occasionally attends church” as adequate substantial evidence to support deny-
ing his claim.178 Similarly, in another case, the court noted that “playing cards, 
watching television, shopping, performing occasional housework, and driving 
children and wife [have been] held inconsistent with disabling pain.”179 Compa-
rably, earlier this year, the Eighth Circuit listed the fact that the claimant was 
“able to perform some household and personal care tasks; drive, shop for gro-
ceries, and live alone; and participate in family functions” as adequate to sup-
port an ALJ’s findings that the claimant was not disabled.180 In another recent 
case, the physician declared the claimant disabled, but the court found the ALJ 
was justified in discrediting the physician’s opinion for the following reasons: 
the claimant was “caring for her young son, preparing his meals, doing house-
work, shopping for groceries, handling money, watching television, and driving 
a car when necessary, among other things—show[ing] that she could work,”181 
and because “she could care for . . . her indoor dog and cat.”182 In another case, 
 
175  Similar case series can be found in virtually every circuit, although there is some varia-
bility between the circuits as discussed later in this article. See, e.g., Craft v. Astrue, 539 
F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2008); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992). 
176  Bartlett, supra note 107, at 1941–42; Krieger, supra note 106, at 1200. 
177  See, e.g., Draper v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 2005); Peterman v. Chater, 
946 F. Supp. 734, 739 (N.D. Iowa 1996). 
178  Bryant v. Colvin, 861 F.3d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 2017). 
179  Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 696 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Riggins v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 
689, 693 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
180  Twyford v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 929 F.3d 512, 517 (8th Cir. 2019). 
181  Thomas v. Berryhill, 881 F.3d 672, 676 (8th Cir. 2018). 
182  Id. at 674. 
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the Eighth Circuit affirmed an ALJ’s denial of benefits where the claimant was 
able to perform daily activities such as “fishing and dog training.”183 Similarly, 
the court supported an ALJ’s findings that activities including “working on the 
computer, watching TV, . . . reading a variety of magazines and newspapers[,] 
visit[ing] friends at their residences . . . , and get[ting] involved socially on a 
weekly basis” were signs that the claimant was not disabled.184 
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has often—sometimes passionately—pointed 
out that simple mainstream activities do not indicate an ability to participate in 
substantial gainful activity. For example, the court noted, “[d]isability under the 
Social Security Act does not mean total disability or exclusion from all forms 
of human and social activity.”185 As mentioned above, the Eighth Circuit em-
phatically explained: 
we have reminded the Commissioner that to find a claimant has the residual 
functional capacity to perform a certain type of work, the claimant must have the 
ability to perform the requisite acts day in and day out, in the sometimes com-
petitive and stressful conditions in which real people work in the real world . . . . 
The ability to do light housework with assistance, attend church, or visit with 
friends on the phone does not qualify as the ability to do substantial gainful ac-
tivity.186 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit pointed out that a “claimant’s[] sporadic and 
transitory activities may demonstrate not his ability but his inability to engage 
in substantial gainful activity.”187 The court also remarked, “an applicant need 
not be completely bedridden or unable to perform any household chores to be 
considered disabled.”188 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit explained that “the mere 
fact that plaintiff can drive a car and is mobile does not establish that he can 
engage in substantial gainful activity.”189 Similarly, the court noted that the 
“ability to . . . engage in hobbies does not amount to substantial evidence that 
claimant has functional capacity for substantial gainful activity.”190 Other cir-
cuit courts have made similar observations.191 
 
183  Fentress v. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2017). 
184  Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 852 (8th Cir. 2007). 
185  Peterman v. Chater, 946 F. Supp. 734, 739 (N.D. Iowa 1996). 
186  Draper v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal block quotation omit-
ted) (quoting Thomas v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
187  Willem v. Richardson, 490 F.2d 1247, 1249 n.4 (8th Cir. 1974) (quoting Wilson v. Rich-
ardson, 455 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1972)). 
188  Pollard v. Astrue, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1233 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (quoting Easter v. Bow-
en, 867 F.2d 1128, 1130 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
189  Yawitz v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (quoting Robinson v. Richard-
son, 360 F. Supp. 243, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)). 
190  Dodson v. Astrue, 346 F. App’x 123, 124 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Wagner v. Astrue, 499 
F.3d 842, 852 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
191  Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (pointing out that “daily activities may 
be grounds for an adverse credibility finding ‘if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part 
of his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are trans-
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3. Simple Mainstream Activities Measure Ability and Will to Survive—
Not Employability 
Doctors often recommend physical and mental activities to treat pain 
and disabilities in people with unquestionable work disabilities.192 Inactivity 
can cause numerous chronic illnesses including heart attack, obesity, coro-
nary artery disease, high blood pressure, stroke, metabolic syndrome, high 
cholesterol, osteoporosis, some cancers, depression, anxiety, and others.193 
Inactivity also increases death rates (i.e., “all-cause mortality”) among peo-
ple with disabilities.194 Physical inactivity has been estimated to cause 9 per-
cent of premature mortality195 and ranked as the “fourth leading risk factor 
for death in the world.”196 Therefore, physicians recommend that most peo-
ple with disabilities be as active as their disability allows, which usually 
means participation in light exercise and simple mainstream activities.197 
Recommended physical activities can include formal exercise, but also in-
cludes activities like vacuuming, mopping, cleaning, walking to the mailbox, 
going to church, and similar activities.198 “Life is motion, motion is life” is a 
well-recognized saying among orthopedic surgeons who specialize in restoring 
 
ferable to a work setting’ ” (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989))); 
Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The administrative law judge’s cas-
ual equating of household work to work in the labor market cannot stand [because the claim-
ant] must take care of her children, or else abandon them to foster care . . . and the choice 
may impel her to heroic efforts.”); Pollard, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1233 (“What counts is the 
ability to perform as required on a daily basis in the ‘sometimes competitive and stressful’ 
environment of the working world.” (quoting Easter, 867 F.2d at 1130)). 
192  Kirsten R. Ambrose & Yvonne Golightly, Physical Exercise as Non-pharmacological 
Treatment of Chronic Pain: Why and When, 29 BEST PRAC. & RSCH. CLINICAL 
RHEUMATOLOGY 120, 121–26 (2015); see also Physical Activity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/physicalactivity/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
J7PK-WMXZ] (noting the importance of physical activity in improving overall health and 
reducing the risk of many chronic diseases). 
193  Health Risks of an Inactive Lifestyle, MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/healthriskso 
faninactivelifestyle.html [https://perma.cc/ZQC8-J5CB]. 
194  Susan A. Carlson et al., Percentage of Deaths Associated with Inadequate Physical Ac-
tivity in the United States, 15 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, March 2018, at 1, 1, 4–5; see 
also, I-Min Lee et al., Effect of Physical Inactivity on Major Non-communicable Diseases 
Worldwide: An Analysis of Burden of Disease and Life Expectancy, 380 LANCET 219, 219–
20 (2012). 
195  Lee et al., supra note 194, at 227. 
196  Laurent Huber & Trevor Shilton, The 4th Leading Risk Factor for Death Worldwide: 
Physical Inactivity Is an Urgent Public Health Priority, NCD ALL. (May 9, 2016, 9:53 AM), 
https://ncdalliance.org/news-events/blog/the-4th-leading-cause-of-death-worldwide-physical 
-inactivity-is-an-urgent-public-health-priority [https://perma.cc/P4HB-LBBK] (citing Physi-
cal Activity, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/health-topics/physical-activity [http 
s://perma.cc/CPA8-AKHP]). 
197  Carlson, supra note 194; Health Risks of an Inactive Lifestyle, supra note 193; Huber & 
Shilton, supra note 196. 
198  Health Risks of an Inactive Lifestyle, supra note 193. 
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patients’ mobility.199 Legal precedents that set unrealistic stereotypical limits 
on physical activity or recreational activity for people with disabilities are 
basically death sentences for some claimants hoping to receive social securi-
ty benefits. 
Cancer is a diagnosis included in the Listing of Impairments as meeting 
the requirements for benefits in many instances, yet if people with other di-
agnoses and similar disabilities perform the same activities recommended by 
physicians for cancer patients, they may not qualify for social security bene-
fits. For example, for patients with breast cancer, “[p]hysical activity after a 
breast cancer diagnosis may lower the risk of death from [this] disease.”200 
Researchers found the “greatest benefit [for breast cancer patients] occurred 
in women who performed the equivalent of walking 3 to 5 hours per week at 
an average pace,” which would be approximately six to fifteen miles of 
walking each week if the average pace is two to three mph.201 Another study 
found as much as a 50 percent decreased in the risk of death from breast 
cancer for women who walked for as little as two to three hours per week.202 
As noted above, many ALJs consider walking much shorter distances as dis-
qualifying (e.g., walking to the mailbox or “short walks” each day) for social 
security disability benefits, so patients with similar disabilities to breast can-
cer patients could easily be disqualified if they follow the same guidelines.203 
Recreational physical activity has proven valuable for other types of 
cancer patients as well. “Research indicates that physical activity may have 
beneficial effects for several aspects of cancer survivorship—specifically, 
weight gain, quality of life, cancer recurrence or progression, and progno-
sis . . . [with] [m]ost of the evidence . . . com[ing] from [patients] diagnosed 
with breast, prostate, or colorectal cancer.”204 For example, multiple studies 
show “that physical activity after a colorectal cancer diagnosis is associated 
 
199  Rick C. Sasso, Orthopaedic Surgery, AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, https://www.facs.org/edu 
cation/resources/residency-search/specialties/ortho [https://perma.cc/7KE5-9UUR]. 
200  Michelle D. Holmes et al., Physical Activity and Survival After Breast Cancer Diagnosis, 
293 JAMA 2479, 2485 (2005); see also Physical Activity and Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/obesity/physical-activity-fact-
sheet [https://perma.cc/R9KJ-RR2Y] (observing epidemiologic students link physical activi-
ty with better breast cancer outcomes). 
201  Holmes et al., supra note 200, at 2479. 
202  Melinda L. Irwin et. al., Influence of Pre- and Postdiagnosis Physical Activity on 
Mortality in Breast Cancer Survivors: The Health, Eating, Activity, and Lifestyle Study, 
26 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3958, 3958 (2008). 
203  See, e.g., Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2008); Crosson v. Shalala, 907 F. 
Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995). 
204  Physical Activity and Cancer (Fact Sheet), ONCOLOGY NURSE ADVISOR (Dec. 13, 
2018) https://www.oncologynurseadvisor.com/home/for-patients/fact-sheets/physical-activi 
ty-and-cancer-fact-sheet/2/ [https://perma.cc/BAJ5-USG4] (“Being physically active after 
a cancer diagnosis is linked to better cancer-specific outcomes for several cancer 
types.”). 
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with reduced risks of dying from colorectal cancer.”205 More specifically, 
one study of colorectal cancer patients showed a “31% lower risk of death” 
for patients who “engaged in leisure-time physical activity” than those who 
did not.206 
People with disabilities other than cancer also benefit from physical and 
mental activities. For example, kidney transplant recipients are specifically 
among those recognized as disabled under the Listing of Impairments for one 
year, and “there is no reason to believe that exercise is not as beneficial to [kid-
ney transplant recipients] as in the general population.”207 Likewise, early on-
set Alzheimer’s patients are encouraged to “[e]ngage in regular physical ac-
tivity,” “to participate in leisure activities, where possible, preserving 
function and quality of life,” and to “keep socially engaged.”208 More specif-
ically, Alzheimer’s disease patients are encouraged to “[c]ontinue or take up 
activities that help to stimulate the brain, e.g., Tai Chi, dancing, puzzles,” 
and to “[i]nclude music in daily life” by “listening to music, playing an in-
strument, singing”—activities clearly more difficult than many ALJ zombie 
factors (like reading, watching television, sewing, or coloring in a coloring 
book).209 
If Alzheimer’s patients and cancer patients are encouraged by medical 
practitioners to participate actively in voluntary physical activities, recreational 
activities, mental activities, and trips away from home, then it seems reasonable 
to suggest that all people with disabilities are likely to similarly benefit from 
the same types of activities, and participation in simple mainstream activities 
does not disprove a disability. Even in the late 1980s before today’s improved 
accessibility, over two-thirds of disabled Americans went to church or syna-
gogue at least occasionally, and 36 percent were active in religious, volun-
teer, or recreational groups;210 in addition, every year one-third went to a 
movie, one-fourth went to live theater or music performance, 83 percent went 
to restaurants, and one-third went to a sports event.211 Disabled Americans are 
not zombies and should not have to become zombies in order to qualify for so-
cial security disability benefits. Promoting zombie factors perpetuates a de-
pendent, institutionalized stereotype of people with disabilities that is simply 
inaccurate and medically dangerous. 
 
205  Id. 
206  Id. 
207  Chapter 26: Lifestyle, supra note 135, at S110. 
208  Program Operations Manual System: DI 23022.385 Early-Onset Alzheimer’s Disease, 
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0423022385 [https://perma.cc/ 
X387-TE7T]; Jeffrey L. Cummings et al., A Practical Algorithm for Managing Alzheimer’s 
Disease: What, When, and Why?, 2 ANNALS CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL NEUROLOGY 307, 
308–09 (2015). 
209  Cummings et al., supra note 208, at 308. 
210  Burgdorf, supra note 36, at 423 n.54, 424 n.55. 
211  Id. at 423. 
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II. REMOVING ZOMBIE FACTORS FROM THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION 
PROCESS 
Zombie factors do not demonstrate employability, and therefore, have no 
relevance to the disability determination process. As first defined in this pa-
per, “zombie factors” are activity restrictions that judges require to find a disa-
bility—such as an inability to perform ADLs and simple mainstream activi-
ties—which do not accurately reflect the capabilities of real people living with 
real disabilities today.212 Zombie factors likely reflect an implicit disability bias 
present in almost 84 percent of able-bodied adults213 that perpetuates a stereo-
typical view that people with true disabilities are unable to live independently 
or participate in mainstream life. The courts’ inconsistent and contradictory rul-
ings involving zombie factors described above likely reflect an internal struggle 
with this implicit bias that is sometimes tamed with deliberate thought and 
sometimes allowed to come to the fore by time constraints on decision-making 
or even by “thoughtlessness and indifference.”214 
When used in the social security disability determination process, zombie 
factors penalize people with disabilities “for attempting to lead normal lives in 
the face of their limitations.”215 Zombie factors like ADLs and simple main-
stream activities are not relevant to the disability determination process because 
they are not evidence of employability. In other words, zombie factors are not 
consistent with Posner’s characteristics that translate into employability be-
cause zombie factor activities (1) “[have] more flexibility in scheduling” than a 
job (e.g., the person could perform the activities on a “good day” and skip them 
on a “bad day”), (2) include the possibility of obtaining assistance from a friend 
or a family member, unlike a job, and (3) do not require “a minimum standard 
of performance,” unlike a job.216 
Structural changes to the law and the SSA disability determination process 
are needed to ensure deliberate and careful consideration before ruling on these 
life-altering cases because almost all adjudicators likely carry some disability 
bias.217 Systematically removing zombie factors from the disability determina-
tion process will help remove implicit bias by forcing adjudicators to explain 
and list only activities relevant to employment; it also will prevent the Social 
Security Administration from contributing to invalid stereotyping of disabled 
people as dependent and segregated. 
 
212  Griffin, supra note 62, at 35. 
213  Dionne et al., supra note 11, at 6. 
214  Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). 
215  Bergfeld v. Barnhart, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1115 (D. Ariz. 2005) (quoting Reddick v. 
Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
216  Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). 
217  Dionne et al., supra note 11, at 2; Wilson & Scior, supra note 10, at 319; see also, Green, 
supra note 14, at 858. 
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 Judge Henry Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit listed the components that he considered the “elements of a fair hear-
ing.”218 Here, three of those elements will be the focus of proposals to remove 
zombie factors: (A) an unbiased tribunal, (B) the making of the record, and (C) 
the statement of reasons. 
A. An Unbiased Tribunal: Testing, Monitoring, and Disciplining the ALJ 
Corp for Implicit Disability Bias 
Subjective judgment is important in interpreting the SSA’s definition of 
disability and ability to work.219 Almost 84 percent of the general population in 
one study “had negative [implicit] attitudes towards . . . people with a disabil-
ity.”220 If ALJs harbor implicit biases that perpetuate stereotypes of people with 
disabilities as being dependent and isolated, those biases can have self-fulfilling 
effects. Because negative implicit biases against people with disabilities are 
pervasive, the SSA should assume its ALJs have these negative biases and take 
action to address disability biases structurally. Addressing implicit bias at the 
ALJ level will likely have a “trickle down” effect throughout the Disability De-
termination Services (DDS) offices because, in a 2010 study, researchers found 
that “knowledge of the extent to which ALJs reverse initial denials was . . . a 
factor in explaining higher reported allowance rates among examiners.”221 
The Social Security Act requires the SSA to hold hearings.222 ALJ SSA 
hearings are non-adversarial, and “the [SSA] is not represented at the hear-
ing.”223 At the hearing, “the ALJ serves as both [the] fact-finder and deci-
sion-maker” and “gathers evidence and calls vocational and medical experts, 
as needed.”224 ALJs have “no constitutionally based judicial power” and “do 
not exercise the broadly independent authority of an Article III judge, but 
rather operate as subordinate executive branch officials [i.e., as bureaucrats] 
who perform quasi-judicial functions within their agencies.”225 ALJs review 
cases de novo and are not bound by determinations made at lower levels.226 
After the hearing, the ALJ can order consultative examinations and further 
 
218  Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279–82, 1287, 
1291, 1293–94 (1975). 
219  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 43 (“SSA’s statutory definition of disability in terms of ‘abil-
ity to work’ is inevitably open to subjective judgment on the part of decision makers.”). 
220  Dionne et al., supra note 11, at 6. 
221  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 44. 
222  SSA’s Astrue Statement, supra note 40 (“Since the passage of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1939, the Social Security Act . . . has required us to hold hearings to deter-
mine the rights of individuals to old age and survivors’ insurance benefits.”). 
223  Id. 
224  Id. 
225  Id. 
226  Id. 
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consider evidence.227 The ALJ “decide[s] the case based upon [the] prepon-
derance of the evidence” standard.228 The ALJ’s decision is final unless the 
claimant appeals or the Appeals Council decides to review the decision on 
its own.229 The claimant “may request [a] review of the decision by the Ap-
peals Council.”230 
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) establishes a process through 
which the SSA makes “competitive service appointments” of ALJs.231 OPM 
administers the ALJ examination as a part of the process.232 Over time, the 
ALJ Corp has grown due to increased worklogs, to address the “backlog cri-
sis” and to “keep pace with demand.”233 In September 2017, the SSA had 
“more than 1,600 ALJs on duty.”234 
Significant variations in rulings are apparent statistically. The average ALJ 
denied around 44 percent of claims from 2009–2011 with significant variations 
between ALJs signified by a standard deviation of 15 percent.235 However, 
some ALJs denied up to 96 percent of claims, while some denied only two per-
cent.236 More recently, the ALJ denial rate has averaged 37 percent.237 One re-
 
227  Id. 
228  Id. 
229  Id. 
230  Id. 
231  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23; see also The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—
Leading Cases: Lucia v. SEC, 132 HARV. L. REV. 287, 287 (2018) (discussing Lucia v. SEC, 
138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) and noting that in Lucia, the Supreme Court held that ALJs of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were subject to the appointments clause, but 
explaining that “Lucia also include[d] language emphasizing the ‘adversarial’ nature of the 
hearings overseen by SEC ALJs, which could provide a basis for” not including SSA ALJs 
because their hearing are non-adversarial; and also stating that the Trump Administration 
responded to Lucia by “exempting all ALJs from competitive civil service hiring require-
ments and requiring them to be appointed by a head of department”). 
232  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
233  SSA’s Astrue Statement, supra note 40. 
234  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. Cf. SSA’s Astrue Statement, supra note 40 
(showing that 1,500 ALJs were part of the corps in 2011). 
235  KRENT & MORRIS, supra note 60, at 1 n.7 (noting that the annual ALJ allowance rate in 
the 2013 study was 56 percent with a standard deviation of 15 percent). “A standard devia-
tion . . . is a measure of how dispersed the data is in relation to the mean. Low standard devi-
ation means data are clustered around the mean, and high standard deviation indicates data 
are more spread out.” Standard Deviation, NAT’L LIBR. OF MED., https://www.nlm.nih.gov/ni 
chsr/stats_tutorial/section2/mod8_sd.html [https://perma.cc/S95V-7L7Q]. 
236  KRENT & MORRIS, supra note 60, at 15–16 (noting that “[t]he lowest and highest allow-
ance rates (4% and 98%, respectively) very nearly spanned the full range of possible val-
ues”). 
237  JACK SMALLIGAN & CHANTEL BOYENS, URB. INST., IMPROVING THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS, 4 (2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/pu 
blication/100710/improving_the_social_security_disability_determination_proces_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A87L-SUX8] (reporting that “63 percent who appealed to the ALJ level 
were . . . allowed”). 
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searcher observed, the “results of an SSDI appeal may turn more on the hap of 
which district judge or magistrate judge is slated to review the appeal than on 
the merits of the case.”238 Some of the variability is attributable to differences 
in claimant populations encountered by particular ALJs because denial rates are 
impacted by the ALJ’s population’s unemployment rates, geographical loca-
tion, and mix of impairments/diagnoses.239 Age also plays a role in denial rates, 
which explains some of the geographic variability given that some states have 
older populations than others.240 Even so, “a great deal of variation in outcomes 
remains unaccounted for,”241 suggesting that the law is being applied uneven-
ly—either from confusion, bias, or some other cause. One researcher noted that 
“statistics strongly suggest that the ‘culture’ within a particular judicial circuit 
makes a substantial difference in . . . decisionmaking.”242 For instance, 
“[r]emand rates from both judges and magistrates in the Seventh, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits . . . were almost double those from judges and magistrates in the 
First and Fourth Circuits.243 The SSA is aware of some unfairness in the pro-
cess but has only acknowledged that there are a “small number of judges 
who underperform or do not apply the statute fairly.”244 
 Although typically applied to employment law, “structural discrimination” 
(i.e., an “organizationally enabled form of discrimination”) may be present in 
the SSA disability determination process, which involves an “interplay between 
individuals [like ALJs and DDS workers] and the larger [SSA] organizational 
environments in which they work.”245 The “specific organizational context” in 
which ALJs interact with claimants and coworkers may “influence[] the opera-
tion and effect of bias.”246 The SSA has an “obligation to avoid facilitating or 
enabling discriminatory bias” in the disability determination process and to try 
to “reduce bias indirectly by triggering change in the context of everyday deci-
sions, perceptions, and judgments.”247 The SSA needs to investigate how the 
organizational structure of the ALJ Corp and the Social Security disability de-
termination process can lead its ALJs to decide that the ability to “color in a 
coloring book” or “watch television” somehow translates into employable 
 
238  Harold J. Krent & Scott Morris, Inconsistency and Angst in District Court Resolution of 
Social Security Disability Appeals, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 372 (2016). 
239  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 44 (reviewing a study that discussed “three factors affecting 
initial allowance rates: (1) the demographic characteristics of applicants, (2) the diagnostic 
mix of applicants, and (3) local labor market conditions”). 
240  Id. at 54 (noting that allowances are sharply higher after age 50, with an additional final 
allowance spike at age 55, and final denial spike at age 62). 
241  Id. at 67. 
242  Krent & Morris, supra note 238. 
243  Id. 
244  SSA’s Astrue Statement, supra note 40. 
245  Green, supra note 14, at 857. 
246  Id. at 854. 
247  Id. at 857–58. 
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skills—it seems plausible considering the examples above that the SSA has a 
structural discrimination issue at play here.248 No matter how egalitarian ALJs 
and SSA employees may believe that they are, the odds are very high that they 
harbor significant implicit disability biases,249 and the SSA should work harder 
to eliminate those biases from its determination process. 
Reducing ALJ implicit disability bias by increasing conscious awareness 
through testing, monitoring, and disciplinary actions could help achieve Judge 
Friendly’s first goal of an unbiased tribunal. The ALJ Corp’s implicit bias 
should be addressed by (1) Implicit Association Test (IAT) testing of poten-
tial new ALJs, (2) training and monitoring during a probationary period for 
new ALJs, and (3) making it easier to remove poorly performing ALJs. 
First, Applicants for SSA ALJs positions should be tested for implicit 
disability bias, and outliers should not be hired. However, since studies re-
veal a very high prevalence (up to 83.6 percent) of “negative implicit atti-
tudes towards people with a disability,”250 some level of implicit disability 
bias should be expected in all people and addressed with training discussed 
below. Testing is needed because implicit bias is difficult to detect in new 
ALJs. “[S]tudies . . . have found that people often behave in ways that appear to 
be inconsistent with their feelings in the presence of those who are stigma-
tized.”251 For example, “a person may hold negative attitudes towards people 
with a physical disability, but their actual behaviour may reflect sympathy and 
kindness.”252 Therefore, it is hard to recognize bias during interviews or when 
reviewing other external observations made about a candidate (e.g., letters of 
recommendation). 
The Disability-Attitudes and Disability-Activity IAT should be used to 
test applicants for SSA ALJ positions to both raise awareness of implicit bias 
and to eliminate outliers from consideration. The IAT is a “web-based test 
that measures the strength of associations between concepts (e.g., ‘Disabled 
Persons,’ ‘Abled Persons’) and evaluations (e.g., ‘Bad,’ ‘Good’).”253 IAT 
scores are based upon “how long it takes (speed) the individual, on average, to 
sort words and images/symbols when the categories are combined, such as 
Good or Disabled Persons and Bad or Abled Persons and vice versa.”254 The 
 
248  See generally Green, supra note 14. 
249  See, e.g., id. at 858 (pontificating that “[e]ven those of us who subscribe wholeheartedly 
to an egalitarian ideal (and spend much of our working lives trying to further that ideal) tend 
to register some bias on the IAT.”). 
250  Dionne et al., supra note 11. 
251  Id. 
252  Id. 
253  ABA COMM’N ON DISABILITY RTS., supra note 10; Dionne et al., supra note 11, at 2 (not-
ing that a paper-based version of the IAT was “developed and validated by [researchers] 
called the Disability-Attitudes IAT,” which “measures implicit attitudes towards people with 
a disability compared to people without a disability”). 
254  ABA COMM’N ON DISABILITY RTS., supra note 10. 
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IAT is based on the fact that “our minds work faster when we make stereotype-
consistent associations and more slowly when we fight against those stereo-
type-consistent associations.”255 Studies have shown a correlation between IAT 
scores and behavior, “suggesting that these biases . . . do translate into behav-
ior.”256 Except in clear outlier cases, the test does not have to be disqualifying 
for the applicant—but could be used to alert the applicant and the SSA to po-
tential implicit biases, giving them the opportunity to consciously address bias-
es during training. 
Second, there should be a probationary and training period for newly hired 
ALJs, which could help the SSA to meet its obligation to provide policy-
compliant decisions free from implicit bias. The President of the United States’ 
budget for fiscal year 2018 included “a proposal that would amend the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act to create a probationary period for newly hired ALJs,” 
and this policy should be adopted.257 In addition, implicit bias training should 
be a part of this probationary period. 
 The American Bar Association (ABA) notes that “implicit biases are mal-
leable and their effect on behavior can be managed and mitigated” with atten-
tion and training.258 Research has shown that “ ‘effortful, deliberative pro-
cessing’ can help mitigate the influence of implicit bias.”259 “De-biasing 
interventions to counter the negative effects of implicit biases by building new 
mental associations” specifically endorsed by the ABA include intergroup con-
tact,260 counter-stereotypes,261 individuation,262 perspective taking,263 delibera-
tive processing,264 common ground,265 education,266 self-monitoring,267 and ac-
countability.268 Data from over 4 million IAT tests from 2004 to 2016 have 
shown that Americans’ implicit “attitudes toward race, skin tone, and sexuality 
have . . . decreased in bias over time.”269 Unfortunately, the same cannot be 
 
255  Green, supra note 14, at 855. 
256  Id. 
257  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
258  ABA COMM’N ON DISABILITY RTS., supra note 10; see Bartlett, supra note 107, at 1941–
42. 
259  CHERYL STAATS ET AL., KIRWIN INST., 2015 STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS 
REVIEW 10 (2015) (quoting Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 1124, 1177 (2012)). 
260  ABA COMM’N ON DISABILITY RTS., supra note 10. 
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263  Id. 
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269  Implicit Attitudes Can Change over the Long Term, ASS’N FOR PSYCH. SCI. (Jan. 7, 2019), 
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said for implicit disability bias; perhaps with deliberative attention among ALJs 
and the leadership of the SSA, a similar trend of decreased implicit disability 
bias can be seen over time in the U.S.270 
Third, it should be easier to discipline and remove ALJs who are making 
discriminatory or biased rulings. The SSA has acknowledged that there are a 
“small number of judges who underperform or do not apply the statute fair-
ly”271 and that “there have been some recent cases in which we hired an ALJ, 
and it later became clear the individual would be unsuccessful at the job.”272 
The SSA has limited statutory authority to discipline ALJs for “underper-
formance or misconduct” other than counseling and reprimand.273 The SSA 
cannot remove or suspend an ALJ, reduce government grade or pay of an 
ALJ, “or furlough [an ALJ] for 30 days or less unless the Merit Systems Pro-
tections Board (MSPB) finds that good cause exists.”274 Use of the MSPB 
can take “years” to remove a bad ALJ.275 For example, in the four years from 
2007 to 2011, only eight ALJs were referred for removal and only twenty 
four suspensions were brought to the MSPB.276 The MSPB is subject to po-
litical drama which may further limit its effectiveness.277 
It certainly is important to preserve the “decisional independence” of 
ALJs. But the SSA has expressed an interest in “examining statistical evi-
dence showing very significant variation between the decisions of a small 
number of ALJs and the decisions of other agency ALJs (whether in the di-
rection of approving or denying claims) and peer review by other ALJs.”278 
ALJs are not Article III judges, but instead are bureaucrats as previously not-
ed;279 thus, statistical analysis of the use of zombie factors should be initiated, 
subject to peer review and more intense agency scrutiny. Because removal is so 
difficult through the MSPB, preliminary testing before hiring, additional train-
ing, and a probationary period as suggested above are especially important until 
 
ml [https://perma.cc/CVB7-23DB]; see Charlesworth & Banaji, supra note 106. 
270  Charlesworth & Banaji, supra note 106, at 186–87. 
271  SSA’s Astrue Statement, supra note 40. 
272  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
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274  Id.; see JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45630, 
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276  Id. 
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Members, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 1, 2019, 10:49 AM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/ 
workforce-rightsgovernance/2019/03/senate-forces-first-for-mspb-as-the-agency-loses-all-
members/ [https://perma.cc/JN94-2YRD]. 
278  SSA’s Astrue Statement, supra note 40. 
279  Id. 
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laws are changed giving the SSA more freedom to remove biased ALJs.280 As 
noted earlier, SSA ALJs are bureaucrats, and people with disabilities should not 
be “left to the mercy of a bureaucrat’s caprice.”281 
B. Making of the Record: Eliminating Zombie Factors from the Record 
The fact that a person with a disability can bathe, walk short distances, 
drive, or go to church does not demonstrate that the person can hold substan-
tial gainful employment. Simply listing these activities as evidence of non-
disability demonstrates laziness or indifference, at best, on the part of the ad-
judicator and bias against people with disabilities, at worst. Zombie factors 
should be included in the record only under unusual circumstances where 
there is something unique about the way the activities are being done that 
demonstrates employability. For example, the claimant takes daily hikes to a 
remote waterfall to bathe, then climbs into his commercial vehicle parked in 
its spot near the waterfall, which he drives on a long and windy road to the 
church, where he dances and sings while intermittently standing and sitting 
for eight hours before driving the commercial vehicle back to its remote 
parking spot and hiking home. Routine daily self-care activities and simple 
mainstream activities that do not specifically demonstrate employability 
have no place in the record because they only serve as potential outlets for 
implicit biases regarding dependency and isolation of people with disabili-
ties. Therefore, zombie factor lists should be systematically eliminated from 
disability determination records at every stage. 
1. The Initial Determination 
In the SSA disability determination process, the record begins when the 
claimant files an application for SSDI or SSI in a Social Security field office, 
over the phone, or via the internet.282 The application forms elicit a “description 
of the claimant’s impairment(s), treatment sources, and other information that 
relates to the alleged disability” along with verification of “non-medical eligi-
 
280  Further, vocational experts (VE) who testify in SSA hearings should be subject to the 
same testing, training, monitoring, and review as ALJs. SSA employs VEs upon whom ALJs 
often rely as “professionals under contract with the SSA to provide impartial testimony in 
agency proceedings.” See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019). VEs help ALJs 
identify the types of jobs the claimant could perform with his or her disabilities and “ascer-
tain whether those kinds of jobs exist[] in significant numbers in the national economy.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). To be reliable, VE’s testimony should be free from im-
plicit disability bias. 
281  Id. at 1163 (Gorsuch & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting). 
282  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23; Disability Determination Process, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN. [hereinafter SSA, Disability Determination Process], https://www.ssa.gov/disability/ 
determination.htm [https://perma.cc/8BSP-XSYY] (also stating that the application itself 
includes forms that “ask for a description of the claimant’s impairment(s), treatment 
sources, and other information that relates to the alleged disability”). 
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bility requirements, which may include age, employment, marital status, or So-
cial Security coverage information.”283 Some zombie factors may be included 
in the initial application and should be removed. 
Because disability applications are processed through local offices, the 
“ideology of elected officials may . . . influence the organizational culture of 
offices that process disability claims” raising the possibility of structural dis-
crimination noted earlier.284 Historically, “[c]onservatives have been more like-
ly to criticize the SSA as an example of a bloated government bureaucracy.”285 
So theoretically, “[c]onservative local officials may be more likely to act in 
ways that dissuade individuals who are unsure about whether to move forward 
in the formal claiming process.”286 In addition, the “ideology of [local] gov-
ernment officials can directly influence the attitudes and behavior of potential 
claimants by legitimating or denigrating public agencies and programs.”287 
Specifically, the “antigovernment/antiwelfare rhetoric of conservative state of-
ficials may decrease the legitimacy of social welfare programs [like the Social 
Security disability programs] and, in so doing, decrease demand.”288 Some evi-
dence suggests this might be occurring. For example, southern states tend to be 
more conservative, and “[o]verall . . . southern states tend to have low[er] ini-
tial allowance rates,”289 and “the three divisions with the lowest initial allow-
ance rates are the southern ones.”290 
Most cases are sent by the field office to a state DDS, “which is responsi-
ble for developing all medical evidence and initially determining whether a 
claimant meets [the Social Security Administration’s] definition of disabil-
ity.”291 DDSs are state agencies, “fully funded by the [f]ederal [g]overnment,” 
that are “responsible for developing medical evidence and making the initial 
determination on whether or not a claimant is disabled.”292 This stage occurs 
“without the state disability examiner seeing the applicant.”293 DDS examiners 
use an Electronic Claims Analysis Tool (eCAT) to help them process applica-
 
283  Id. 
284  Joe Soss & Lael R. Kaiser, The Political Roots of Disability Claims: How State Envi-
ronments and Policies Shape Citizen Demands, 59 POL. RSCH. Q. 133, 137–38 (2006). 
285  Id. at 137. 
286  Id. at 138. 
287  Id. 
288  Id. 
289  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 50. 
290  Id. at 48 (“[T]he three divisions with the lowest initial allowance rates are the southern 
ones,” including “West South Central, East South Central, and South Atlantic.”). 
291  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
292  SSA, Disability Determination Process, supra note 282. 
293  SMALLIGAN & BOYENS, supra note 237, at 3; see SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23 
(“Generally, the disability examiner works with a medical or psychological consultant, or 
both, to determine whether the claimant is disabled.”). 
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tions.294 eCATs could be used to help scrub zombie factors from the application 
automatically by using computer prompts that prevent the entry of zombie fac-
tors without explanation as to their relationship to employability. 
Determinations are made “largely based on the medical evidence the appli-
cant provides, with the DDS offices procuring only a limited amount of addi-
tional evidence.”295 Once the evidence it collected, DDS “staff make[] the ini-
tial disability determination.”296 The initial determination took “three to five 
months” or “an average of 111 days” in 2018.297 Approximately 55 percent of 
initial applications are denied.298 Applicants have 60 days from notice of denial 
to appeal.299 The majority of initial denials are appealed.300 “The first stage [of 
an appeal] is a reconsideration by the state DDS, where the case is reviewed by 
a different examiner and the applicant has the opportunity to submit additional 
evidence.”301 Approximately 12.6 percent of reconsideration level claims are 
allowed.302 
Initial application forms should exclude zombie factors or any questions 
that reinforce biases that work-disabled people must be dependent and isolated 
(i.e., unable to live independently or participate in simple mainstream activi-
ties). Applications should query activities for signs of being relevant to em-
ployability like daily prolonged activities consistent with the demands of a 
work schedule. If simple mainstream activities are included, their duration and 
frequency should be queried because, with new accessibility laws, mainstream 
recreational activities like fishing,303 hunting,304 owning a pet,305 going to a 
 
294  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23 (“eCAT is a policy compliant web-based applica-
tion designed to assist the user throughout the sequential evaluation process. The tool aids in 
documenting, analyzing, and adjudicating the disability claim according to our regula-
tions.”). 
295  SMALLIGAN & BOYENS, supra note 237, at 3. 
296  SSA, Disability Determination Process, supra note 282 (“After completing its develop-
ment of the evidence, trained staff at the DDS makes the initial disability determination.”). 
297  SOC. SEC. ADMIN., NO. 05-10029, DISABILITY BENEFITS 4 (July 2019) (indicating that 
“[p]rocessing an application for disability benefits can take three to five months”); 
SMALLIGAN & BOYENS, supra note 237, at 6 (“In 2018, a worker with a disability who filed a 
new claim for SSDI benefits had to wait an average of 111 days for an initial decision. This 
wait time has been fairly consistent over the past five years, ranging from 110 to 114 days.”). 
298  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 42 tbl.1. 
299  Id. at 42. 
300  Id. at 42 tbl.1 (revealing that of the 2.8 million denials, 1,778,805 or 63 percent ap-
pealed). 
301  Id. at 42. 
302  SMALLIGAN & BOYENS, supra note 237, at 4. 
303  See, e.g., Colorado Accessible Fishing, COLO. FISHING NETWORK, https://coloradofishing. 
net/Accessible.htm [https://perma.cc/4TWH-WTXB] (“Colorado has many river and lake 
locations which offer accessible fishing with facilities such as handicapped fishing piers, 
paved trails, and wheelchair access.”); Fishing Equipment, MOVE UNITED, https://www.mov 
eunitedsport.org/sports/adaptive-equipment/fishing-equipment/ [https://perma.cc/U4R4-VH 
CX]. 
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movie,306 and similar activities are now common among people with disabili-
ties. The applications should be modified to emphasize activities that actually 
demonstrate the claimant can work eight hours per day, five days per week—
not occasionally participate in a voluntary recreational activity. 
 In addition, SSA employees should be trained to avoid relying upon 
zombie factors in making their determinations. Zombie factor “evidence” 
should be removed from the file by law to help prevent reliance and bias. 
eCAT could also be modified to help spot and eliminate reliance on zombie 
factors. 
2. The ALJ Hearing 
If dissatisfied with the reconsideration determination, the claimant can re-
quest a hearing before an ALJ through the Office of Disability Adjudication 
and Review (ODAR).307 “[Eighty-five] percent of the reconsideration denials 
are appealed.”308 In 2017, approximately 632,000 requests were made for an 
ALJ hearing, and over one million people were “waiting for a decision on their 
hearing request” with an average wait time of around 600 days for a hearing 
decision.309 
Nowhere are the differences between courts and agencies more pronounced 
than in Social Security proceedings, which are not based on the judicial model 
of decision-making.310 The most important difference is that “Social Security 
proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial.”311 ALJs act as “examin-
er[s] charged with developing the facts” and have a “duty to investigate the 
 
304  See, e.g., Hunting, MOVE UNITED, https://www.moveunitedsport.org/sport/hunting/ [https 
://perma.cc/RB35-LMSS]; Deer Hunting for Hunters with Disabilities, WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. 
RES., https://dnr.wi.gov/topic/hunt/disdeer.html [https://perma.cc/DAT6-2JTN]. 
305  See, e.g., Lynette A. Hart, Community Context and Psychosocial Benefits of Animal 
Companionship, in HANDBOOK ON ANIMAL-ASSISTED THERAPY 73, 82 (Aubrey H. Fine ed., 
2d ed. 2006). 
306  See, e.g., Assistive Moviegoing, AMC THEATRES, https://www.amctheatres.com/assistive 
-moviegoing [https://perma.cc/B5E9-52LC]. 
307  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 42. 
308  Id. at 43. 
309  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
310  Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110 (2000) (“The differences between courts and agencies 
are nowhere more pronounced than in Social Security proceedings. Although ‘[m]any agen-
cy systems of adjudication are based to a significant extent on the judicial model of decision-
making,’ . . . the SSA is ‘[p]erhaps the best example of an agency’ that is not. . . . ‘The most 
important of [the SSA’s modifications of the judicial model] is the replacement of normal 
adversary procedure by . . . the investigatory model.’ ” (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted) (quoting Judge Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1267, 1290 (1975))). 
311  Id. at 110–11. 
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facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.”312 The 
ALJ is “to conduct a disability hearing in ‘an informal, non-adversarial man-
ner.’ ”313 
ALJs “review[] . . . disability case[s] de novo.”314 The ALJ will consider 
evidence, applicant testimony, and witness testimony under oath.315 ALJs often 
also use questionnaires that require patients to list their basic activities of daily 
living in detail.316 “The ALJ may call vocational and medical experts to offer 
opinion evidence, and the claimant or the claimant’s representative may ques-
tion these witnesses.”317 The hearing rules “are less rigid than those a court 
would follow,” and evidence may be presented “in a disability hearing that 
would not be admissible in court.”318 Some ALJs and courts erroneously com-
bine “the substantial evidence standard . . . with procedural rules governing the 
admission of evidence,” significantly lowering the bar for the SSA’s burden of 
proof.319 “[T]he ALJ considers all of the evidence” and makes a decision 
“[o]nce the record is complete.”320 A claimant may appeal an ALJ’s decision to 
the Appeals Council, “which is comprised of a panel of ALJs.”321 
A claimant who has completed the SSA’s administrative review process 
can appeal the decision in the federal court system.322 The SSA processed 
16,448 new court cases in 2018.323 District courts remand an average of 43.7 
percent of cases.324 Remand rates vary significantly across circuits such that 
 
312  Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (stating that the social security hearing 
examiner “acts as an examiner charged with developing the facts”); see also Sims, 530 U.S. 
at 111 (explaining that “[i]t is the ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and develop the argu-
ments both for and against granting benefits”). 
313  Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(b), 
416.1400(b) (2018)). 
314  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
315  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 42. 
316  See, e.g., Crysler v. Astrue, 563 F. Supp. 2d 418, 443 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (mentioning the 
claimant’s daily activities questionnaire); Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 852 (8th Cir. 
2007) (discussing activities listed on a “Daily Activities Questionnaire”). 
317  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
318  Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
319  Id. at 1162 (Gorsuch & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting) (“Some courts have even conflated the 
substantial evidence standard—a substantive standard governing what’s needed to sustain a 
judgment as a matter of law—with procedural rules governing the admission of evidence. 
These courts have mistakenly suggested that, because the Federal Rules of Evidence don’t 
apply in Social Security proceedings, anything an expert says will suffice to meet the agen-
cy’s burden of proof.”). 
320  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
321  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 42. 
322  SSA’s Disman Statement, supra note 23. 
323  Hearings and Appeals: Federal Court Review Process, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/court_process.html [https://perma.cc/QTW3-TKQD]. 
324  JONAH GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, A STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, PENN L.: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 96 (2016), 
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“[k]nowing the judicial circuit in which the appeal was filed was the single 
most significant factor . . . in predicting whether there would be a remand.”325 
For example, “[r]emand rates from district court judges in the Seventh, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits almost doubled the rates within the First and Fourth Cir-
cuit.”326 
There are several potential solutions related to zombie factors that could 
help. Removal of zombie factors from the record and from consideration by ad-
judicators could result in more consistent application of the law between cir-
cuits and ALJs. Zombie factors should not be included in any pre-hearing ALJ 
questionnaires nor in information obtained during the hearing because they 
have no relationship with employability as previously noted.327 Some hearing 
rules prohibiting questions and entry of zombie factors into the record as “evi-
dence” should be formulated. 
C. Statement of Reasons for the ALJ’s Decision: Eliminating Zombie Factors 
from the Five-Step Process 
A five-step sequential evaluation process328 is used by DDS employees, 




325  Krent & Morris, supra note 238, at 395. 
326  Id. 
327  See supra Part I.A.3. 
328  20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (2018) provides the five-step sequential evaluation process: 
 (4) The five-step sequential evaluation process. The sequential evaluation process is a 
series of five “steps” that we follow in a set order. See paragraph (h) of this section for 
an exception to this rule. If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, 
we make our determination or decision and we do not go on to the next step. If we 
cannot find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we go on to the next step. 
Before we go from step three to step four, we assess your residual functional capacity. 
(See paragraph (e) of this section.) We use this residual functional capacity assessment 
at both step four and at step five when we evaluate your claim at these steps. These are 
the five steps we follow: (i) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If 
you are doing substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled. (See 
paragraph (b) of this section.) (ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity 
of your impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 416.909, or a combination 
of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, we will find that 
you are not disabled. (See paragraph (c) of this section.) (iii) At the third step, we also 
consider the medical severity of your impairment(s). If you have an impairment(s) that 
meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404 of this chap-
ter and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are disabled. (See para-
graph (d) of this section.) (iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your 
residual functional capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past 
relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled. See paragraphs (f) and (h) of this 
section and § 416.960(b). (v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of 
your residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work experience to see 
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“[E]mployment, medical, and vocational factors [are considered] in that or-
der.”330 In the analysis, ALJs must state reasons for discounting claimants’ 
credibility and for discounting treating physicians’ testimony.331 As noted by 
Judge Friendly, a written statement of reasons is important for a fair hearing 
because (1) it is “almost essential” for judicial review, (2) “necessity for justifi-
cation is a powerful preventive of wrong decisions,” (3) it “tends to effectuate 
intra-agency uniformity,” (4) it “may even make a decision somewhat more ac-
ceptable to a losing claimant,” and (5) the “requirement is not burdensome.”332 
Zombie factors should not be allowed among the list of reasons for negative 
determinations; to be clear, activities are not zombie factors if the adjudicator 
explains how the activity translates into an employable skill (e.g., duration, 
repetition). In other words, the ALJ should not be able to simply list the fact 
that a claimant can “bathe,” “drive,” or “take care of a pet” as evidence that he 
or she is employable without explaining what it is about bathing or pet care in 
his or her particular situation that makes it relevant to employability or discred-
its testimony about pain or disability. 
Physician testimony should withstand zombie factors. It is a “well-
established rule . . . that the [ALJ] must give substantial weight to the testimony 
of a claimant’s treating physician, unless good cause is shown,” so physician 
opinions regarding disability are well-recognized as being important.333 Courts 
recognize that “[t]he treating physician’s continuing relationship with the 
claimant makes him especially qualified to evaluate reports from examining 
doctors, to integrate the medical information they provide, and to form an over-
all conclusion as to the [claimant’s] functional capacities and limitations.”334 
ALJs must “set[] forth ‘specific, legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial 
evidence in the record” to reject treating physicians opinions “by setting out a 
detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evi-
 
if you can make an adjustment to other work. If you can make an adjustment to other 
work, we will find that you are not disabled. If you cannot make an adjustment to oth-
er work, we will find that you are disabled. See paragraphs (g) and (h) of this section 
and § 416.960(c). (5) When you are already receiving disability benefits. If you are al-
ready receiving disability benefits, we will use a different sequential evaluation pro-
cess to decide whether you continue to be disabled. We explain this process in 
§ 416.994(b)(5). 
20 C.F. R. § 416.920 (2018) (emphasis omitted). 
329  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 41 (describing the five-step sequential process used by DDS 
employees to determine whether the applicant qualifies for benefits); see also WIXON & 
STRAND, supra note 127, at 1. 
330  Meseguer, supra note 41, at 41. 
331  Bergfeld v. Barnhart, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1111 (D. Ariz. 2005). 
332  Friendly, supra note 218, at 1292. 
333  Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1987). 
334  Bergfeld, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 1111 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 
1995)). 
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dence.”335 “The phrase ‘substantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’ used throughout 
administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency [fact find-
ing].”336 “Substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”337 
Zombie factors are not “substantial evidence” of lack of pain or disability 
because people with painful disabilities must continue to perform these activi-
ties to survive—as noted above.338 “[C]learly mistaken evidence, fake evidence, 
speculative evidence, and conclusory evidence aren’t substantial evidence.”339 
When ALJs list zombie factors among their evidence, they are at best listing 
speculative conclusory evidence and at worst listing clearly mistaken or fake 
evidence based on implicit disability biases. Physicians are usually aware that 
people with disabilities and with pain must still participate in ADLs and in 
simple mainstream activities—so, as experts, they have likely already taken 
those facts into consideration in developing their opinions; therefore, ALJs 
should not be able to overrule their expertise using irrelevant zombie factors. 
 Similarly, ALJs should not be able to list zombie factors in their negative 
credibility assessment of the claimant’s subjective reports of pain or disability. 
“[I]n evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain [or other symp-
toms], the adjudicator must give full consideration to all of the available evi-
dence, medical and other”—“includ[ing] the claimant’s prior work record, her 
daily activities, and observations by treating and examining physicians and 
third parties about the claimant’s symptoms and their effects.”340 “Subjective 
complaints may be discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a 
whole.”341 To discount the claimant’s subjective complaints, the adjudicator 
generally “must make an express credibility determination detailing reasons for 
discrediting the testimony[] [and] must set forth the inconsistencies.”342 Zombie 
factors should not be used among those “inconsistencies,” because zombie fac-
tor activities are not inconsistent with pain or disability—i.e., people in the 
worst pain and with the worst disabilities (e.g., cancer patients) must usually 
continue to perform ADLs and simple mainstream activities to stay alive and 
have basic quality of life.343 
 
335  Id. (first quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) and then quoting 
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
336  Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). 
337  Id.; see also Bryant v. Colvin, 861 F.3d 779, 782 (8th Cir. 2017) (defining that 
“[s]ubstantial evidence is less than a preponderance but . . . enough that a reasonable mind 
would find it adequate to support the conclusion” (quoting Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 
964 (8th Cir. 2015))). 
338  See supra Part I.A.2. 
339  Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1160 (Gorsuch & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting). 
340  Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted). 
341  Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). 
342  Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 1998). 
343  See, e.g., Section I.A.3. 
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 ALJ’s credibility findings are particularly important. “It is well settled that 
an ALJ’s credibility findings on a claimant’s subjective complaints are entitled 
to deference” because “ ‘the ALJ is best positioned’ to make these determina-
tions because of the opportunity to observe the claimant first-hand.”344 There-
fore, courts have a more difficult time overturning ALJ decisions based upon 
adverse credibility findings, so ALJs must get these determinations right to 
avoid unjust outcomes. To do so, zombie factors should be eliminated from 
credibility determinations. 
To avoid biased and discriminatory outcomes, the SSA should ban the use 
of zombie factors during the five-step sequential evaluation analysis. As noted 
above, zombie factors are not signs of employability and their use propagates a 
stigmatic discriminatory view of people with disabilities as dependent and una-
ble to participate in mainstream activities.345 If zombie factors are all that the 
ALJ has to list, then either there is no evidence of disability346 or the ALJ is not 
doing a proper inquisitorial review. Either way, claimants should not continue 
to be victimized by the implicit disability biases of some ALJs, and the SSA 
disability determination process should not prop up biases and stereotypes that 
negatively impact the disability community. 
CONCLUSION 
People with disabilities are not zombies. “It should go without saying”347 
that people with disabilities must do the things necessary to stay alive—
including performing ADLs and simple mainstream activities. Yet, many ALJs 
and courts seem to struggle with this basic fact. As defined for the first time in 
detail in this paper, “zombie factors” are judicial rules related to activity re-
strictions that define disability in ways that are so restrictive that they could vir-
tually only be met by fictitious zombies—such as living without food, without 
personal hygiene or a clean home, without significant movement/exercise, 
without social interaction, without happiness provided by any recreational ac-
tivity, and without simple, mainstream semblances of human life. Posner cor-
rectly recognized that this failure to differentiate between job requirements and 
personal care requirements is “a recurrent, and deplorable, feature of opinions 
 
344  Holiday v. Barnhart, 460 F. Supp. 2d 790, 804 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
345  See Part I. 
346  Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1160 (2019) (Gorsuch & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting) 
(observing that “[t]he refusal to supply readily available evidentiary support for a conclusion 
strongly suggests that the conclusion is, well, unsupported”; and also explaining that “[t]he 
unfavorable inference . . . is especially applicable where the party withholding the evidence 
has had notice or has been ordered to produce it” (ALJs have such notice in SSA disability 
cases) (quoting in part 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 156(2) (1964))). 
347  Amick v. Celebrezze, 253 F. Supp. 192, 196 (D.S.C. 1966). 
21 NEV. L.J. 161 
Fall 2020] IMPLICIT DISABILITY BIAS 205 
 
by administrative law judges in social security disability cases” that has been 
going on for decades.348 
By using zombie factors in their disability determinations, the SSA vali-
dates and propagates prejudicial stereotypes of people with disabilities as being 
unable to live independently or participate in mainstream society. In addition, 
zombie factors contribute to arbitrary outcomes of the social security disability 
determination process that cause real people with real disabilities great suffer-
ing and loss. As a physician, I personally witnessed this devastation in my dis-
abled patients’ lives. 
America has made significant progress in correcting some invidious dis-
crimination and indifference349 toward people with disabilities by enacting laws 
like the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADAAA, among others.350 How-
ever, implicit bias remains a pervasive problem for people with disabilities351—
especially when it affects major programs that are meant to be lifelines like 
SSDI and SSI. Courts’ and ALJs’ arbitrary use of ADLs and simple main-
stream activities as evidence to deny benefits demonstrated in this paper re-
flects an implicit bias that people with true work disabilities must be unable to 
live independently or enjoy simple mainstream life.352 
Even though the SSA is the “Mount Everest of bureaucratic structures,”353 
some simple changes to the disability determination process could help prevent 
future applicants from being “left to the mercy of a bureaucrat’s caprice.”354 
Ability to perform ADLs and simple mainstream activities does not transfer in-
to employable skill because these zombie factor activities (1) “[have] more 
flexibility in scheduling” than a job, (2) include the possibility of obtaining as-
sistance from a friend or a family member, unlike a job, and (3) do not require 
“a minimum standard of performance,” unlike a job.355 
Zombie factors do not demonstrate employability, and therefore, should be 
systematically eliminated from the disability determination process; this can be 
done by concentrating on three of Judge Friendly’s elements of a fair hear-
ing.356 First, an unbiased tribunal should be sought by (1) testing ALJs for im-
plicit disability bias, (2) including a probationary and training period for ALJs 
to recognize and avoid biased determinations, (3) monitoring of ALJs for use of 
zombie factors in their decisions, and (4) disciplining ALJs who routinely use 
 
348  Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). 
349  Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n.12 (1985). 
350  See FRIEDEN, supra note 6, at 4. 
351  See Dionne et al., supra note 11, at 1; ABA Comm’n on Disability Rts., supra note 10. 
352  See Part II. 
353  Verkuil, supra note 21, at 781. 
354  Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1163 (2019) (Gorsuch & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting). 
355  Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). 
356  Friendly, supra note 218, at 1279–94. 
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zombie factors to deny benefits.357 Second, the record should be kept clean 
from zombie factors. For example, the fact that a person with a disability can 
bathe, walk short distances, drive, or go to church does not demonstrate that 
the person can hold substantial gainful employment;358 so, such information 
should not be included in the record at all—including at the initial determi-
nation level, the ALJ hearing level, and all the way through the federal court 
system. Finally, ALJs should not be allowed to list zombie factors among the 
reasons for denying claims, discounting claimant credibility, or ignoring 
physician statements regarding disability during the five-step sequential 
analysis process. 
Removal of subjective bias related to zombie factors would help adjudica-
tors focus on true measures of disability and decrease the arbitrary nature of 
their decisions. Evidence suggests that implicit biases can be changed over 
time.359 Social Security disability programs are a lifeline for some of the most 
vulnerable members of American society. ALJs need to better understand when 
to throw that lifeline to someone with a disability. Drowning victims do not al-
ways look like the stereotypes (e.g., they may not appear to be in distress and 
may even swim weakly) even though they are really drowning, so trained life-
guards must recognize the reality and not the stereotype.360 Similarly, people 
with disabilities often do not look like the stereotypes (e.g., they are not de-
pendent and segregated from society) even though they really are disabled, so 
ALJs (and the courts) must recognize the reality and not the stereotype. In my 
opinion, people with real disabilities continue to attempt to survive with as 
much quality of life as possible, often by living independently and by partici-
pating in some simple mainstream activities; however, that does not mean they 
are employable. SSA needs to better train ALJs on when to throw the lifeline. 
The ADA was said to “reflect[] deeply held American ideals that treasure 
the contributions that individuals can make when free from arbitrary, unjust, or 
outmoded societal attitudes and practices that prevent the realization of their 
potential.”361 America has made significant progress in removing some of the 
thoughtlessness and indifference of the past with regard to people with disabili-
 
357  See Section II.A. 
358  See Section I.A. 
359  See, e.g., Implicit Attitudes Can Change over the Long Term, supra note 269; see also 
Charlesworth & Banaji, supra note 106, at 189. 
360  Catherine Roberts, How to Spot the Real Signs of Drowning, CONSUMER REPS. (June 25, 
2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/outdoor-safety/how-to-spot-the-signs-of-drowning/ 
[https://perma.cc/597W-98GJ] (noting that “despite the pervasive image” of waving and 
screaming, drowning often looks much different than “popularized in media and movies”); 
see also Know the Signs of Water Distress, CEDARS-SINAI BLOG (July 13, 2017), https://ww 
w.cedars-sinai.org/blog/summer-safety-know-the-signs-of-water-distress.html [https://perma 
.cc/MGZ9-FZH6] (noting that swimmers near drowning may continue to swim weakly or in 
the wrong direction, among other signs). 
361  ADA NAT’L NETWORK, supra note 66 (referencing the ADA Preamble). 
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ties. However, if the ideals expressed in the ADA are really deeply held Ameri-
can ideals, then it is time to bring the SSA into the twenty-first century by elim-
inating outdated zombie factors from disability determinations. 
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